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FEDERAL INTERPRETATION OF STATE LAW
J. MARK JACOBSON'"
I.
A federal system of government inherently raises difficult problems of
cooperation. The demarcation of legislative powers between the central and
state units, the overlapping of national and local administrative authorities,
the interplay of federal and regional political parties and electoral machinery
all produce situations that call for constant readjustments. Federalism,
though undoubtedly desirable in a large and varied country, inevitably brings
along with itself conflicts of power and jurisdiction; and these very clashes
give birth to an intricate maze of delicate and finespun accommodations.
Federalism is generally characterized by a dual court system. Although
it is possible for state courts to act as federal tribunals, and although this sys-
tem was actually proposed in the first American Congress,1 most federations,
because of the desirability of strength in the central government, have super-
imposed a system of federal courts upon the already existing hierarchy of
state tribunals.2 And whenever this constitutional machinery is created,
there inevitably arises the intricate problem of allocating functions to each
set of courts. Moreover, since the amount of work performed by the courts
exceeds that of the legislatures, since the courts deal not with general eco-
nomic and social objectives alone, but with concrete cases involving rights
and liabilities of definite individuals, and since party accommodations are far
fewer in the judiciary than in the more political branches of the government,
the points of conflict between state and federal tribunals accordingly become
tA. B., M.A., 1926, Ph.D., 1929, Brown University; LL. B., 1934, Yale University;
attorney, National Labor Relations Board; member of the New York bar; author of Dam-
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odicals.
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2. See, on the general problem, Mor, PROBLEM OF FEDERALISM (i93i).
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more numerous and much sharper than even the clashes of legislative power.
Similarly, although in the administrative branches of government a large
amount of harmonious cooperation smooths over the innumerable points at
which conflicts between central and local powers occasionally occur, no such
working agreements have characterized the relations of our federal and state
judges.
The framers of the Constitution, in their attempt at the distribution of
judicial powers, gave to the federal courts a significant share. To them they
allocated all cases involving a federal question-namely, "all cases, in law and
equity, arising under this Constitution, the laws of the United States, and
treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority" 3 and all cases
of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction-and controversies concerning va-
rious types of parties, the most important of such controversies being those
in which the United States Government itself is a party, those between two or
more states, and those between citizens of different states.- Article III of the
Constitution left the exact organization and powers of the federal judiciary
indefinite, and the first Congress in the famous Judiciary Act of 1789 5
undertook to settle more concretely this problem in federalism. That act
provided on the one hand for a review by the United States Supreme Court
of state decisions involving rights claimed under the national Constitution,
laws, or treaties; and, on the other hand, it required that, in cases involving
an interpretation of state law, "the laws of the several states, except where
the Constitution, treaties or statutes of the United States shall otherwise re-
quire or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in trials at common
law in the courts of the United States in cases where they apply." 6 The
resulting legal system thus permits state tribunals to interpret federal laws
and federal tribunals to interpret state laws. In the former case, by writ of
error the Federal Supreme Court can correct a state court's misinterpretation
of the Federal Constitution, statutes, or treaties; in the latter instance, how-
ever, no machinery exists to enable a state to rectify a federal judge's error in
determining the meaning of a state law. And herein lies one of the most
serious sources of conflict in the federal system.
Federal interpretation of state law occurs primarily in three respects.
In the first place, the federal courts have jurisdiction in controversies be-
tween citizens of different states where the amount at issue is more than three
thousand dollars.7  In such cases the federal district court is required to
determine and apply the law of the state in which it is sitting. Today the
most important diversity cases involve corporations chartered in one state
3. U. S. CoNsT. Art. III, § 2.
4. Ibid., as amended by the Eleventh Amendment.
5. 1 STAT. 73 (1789), 28 U. S. C. A. § 141 and historical note (1928).
6. I STAT. 92 (1789), 28 U. S. C. A. §725 (1928).
7. 48 STAT. 775 (934), 28 U. S. C. A. § 41 (I) (Supp. 1937).
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and doing business in another. In the second place, where a federal court
has assumed jurisdiction on the basis of a federal question and there is in-
volved in the same litigation a non-federal issue, it decides both issues; 8
however, in the settlement of the non-federal issues the court is required to
apply state law. Thus a corporation doing an intrastate business may in the
same action sue a competitor both for infringement of patent rights and
for unfair competition. And in the third place, the United States Supreme
Court has the power to review decisions from state supreme courts involving
a federal question,9 and it may happen that to determine this federal issue the
Court may be required to interpret state constitutional, statutory, or common
law. This situation arises most frequently under the contract clause of the
Constitution."0
An adequate understanding of the problems and the conflicts that have
resulted from such federal interpretations of state laws demands a review
of the factors and influences behind the establishment of the federal judiciary.
The Constitution was drafted by representatives of those economic and social
classes that suffered from the post-Revolutionary conditions." Not one
member represented, in his intimate personal economic interests, the small
farming or mechanic classes.' 2  The agrarian legislature of Rhode Island
refused to send delegates to the plutocratic gathering that it suspected the
Philadelphia convention would become. Thus Patrick Henry, the populist
leader of Virginia and a delegate from that state, "smellt a rat" and refused
to attend.' 8 The financial and mercantile groups in the new republic had
suffered serious losses in the reaction that set in after the separation from
England.14 Under the pressure of the revolutionary natural rights philoso-
phy government had become weak and decentralized. State governments
had powerless executives and omnipotent legislatures. The central Govern-
ment under the Articles of Confederation possessed no authority over the
individual nor power to raise taxes and could act only through the states;
the Continental Congress accordingly constituted only an ineffectual symbol
of a loose union. Colonial independence from Great Britain had meant with-
drawal from the benefits, as well as the handicaps, of the British mercantile
8. Mutual Film Co. v. Industrial Comm. of Ohio, 215 Fed. 138 (N. D. Ohio, 1914), aff'd,
236 U. S. 23o (1915) ; Young & Jones v. Hiawatha Gin & Mfg. Co., 17 F. (2d) 193 (S. D.
Miss. 1927).
9. 45 STAT. 54, 28 U. S. C. A. § 344 (1928).
1o. U. S. CONST. Art. I, § io.
II. JACOBSON, DEVELOPMENT OF AmERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT (1932) I68.
12. "Too much emphasis cannot be put upon the fact that the mercantile and financial in-
terests were the weightiest of all the influences for the Constitution; the debtor and agricul-
tural interests the strongest groups against it. It deserves repetition, for a proper understand-
ing of the craft and force practiced by both sides in the battle over ratification, that those who
owed debts were generally against the Constitution, and practically all to whom debts were
due were for the new Government." I BEvERmGE, LIrFE OF JOHx MARSHAIL (1919) 312. See
BEAim, ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION (1913) 149-51.
13. BEARD, RISE OF AMERICAN CvILIzATIoN (930) 311.
14. JACOBSON, op. cit. supra note ii, at 164-168.
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system. Since the impotent central Government could not negotiate favor-
able trade treaties with other European powers, the loss of foreign trade had
threatened to wipe out the American merchants. Interstate trade had become
even more chaotic: each state, jealous of its neighbors, had attempted by
means of tariff walls and restrictive legislation to keep money from going
beyond its own boundaries and had set up its own system of currency; the
continuous fluctuations in and exchange difficulties of money had seriously
discouraged trading; and the hostile attitude of the state courts toward non-
resident creditors had frequently prevented the collection of debts contracted
in interstate trade.
Chaotic finances likewise characterized the post-Revolutionary period.
In an effort to finance the Revolution, the Continental Congress and the states
had floated large bond issues and had printed much paper money. 'Both the
securities and the money, unsupported save by the hope of victory and of
possible repayment, depreciated rapidly in value. Thomas Jefferson re-
corded that he had sold some land before the issuance of paper currency,
but that he had not received the money until "it was not worth Oak leaves". '5
This depreciation of money resulted in a significant struggle between the
creditor and debtor classes, in which, naturally, the former lost heavily.
The debtor-creditor conflict, which had begun in pre-Revolutionary days,
now took an acute form; and constant agitation, occasionally successful, in
favor of fiat money, lax bankruptcy acts, and instalment laws punctuated
politics. The depreciation of public securities and paper currencies led to
speculation in bonds, money, and land certificates. The moneyed men gam-
bled on the possibility of repayment; but as long as the central Government
could not raise sufficient revenues, as long as the agrarian debtors controlled
state legislatures, and as long as the central Government was too weak to
build roads into the West or to afford protection to settlers against Indian
attacks, the market for those securities remained depressed.
While American historians have long written the story of the Constitu-
tional Convention as an epic of conflict and compromise, nevertheless virtual
unanimity existed in its essential objectives. The delegates, members of
financial, mercantile, and large planter classes, differed only in the means of
achieving their common ends. Not the conflicts and compromises, but the
uniform distrust of democracy and the universal desire for stability stand out
in clear perspective.-" And the American Constitution is the result of the
economic and political situation existing in the country after the Revolution
and of the attitude which that situation inspired in the delegates at Philadel-
phia. Being practical men of affairs, the framers proceeded to write into the
x5. From a letter to Meusnier, January 24, 1786, published in 4 JEFFERSON, WORKS (Ford
ed. 1894) 138.
I6. I BEVERIDGF, op. cit. supra note 12, at 252; JACOBSON, oP. cit. supra note ii, at i6g.
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Constitution provisions which, they hoped, would eliminate the evils then
disturbing their economic well-being. Only a few of the many devices for
stability need be mentioned. In order to prevent agrarian state legislatures
from passing lenient bankruptcy and instalment laws, the Constitution for-
bade the states to pass any law impairing the obligation of contracts.' 7 In
order to provide an agency sufficiently strong to act as a bulwark of the con-
servative rights against agrarian attacks, the framers created an independent
judiciary, chosen for life -8 by what they hoped would be the most conserva-
tive organs of the new government-the President and the Senate; 19 and
they declared that the Federal Constitution, laws, and treaties should be the
supreme law of the land, binding on the judges of every state.20 And in
order to enable merchants to collect their interstate debts and to circumvent
the discrimination of state courts against non-resident creditors, the new
federal courts were given jurisdiction in controversies between citizens of
different states.
2 '
The judiciary section of the Constitution was subject to the most devas-
tating attacks by the anti-Federalists, 22 and, as Beveridge has stated, it was
"the weakest part of the Constitutionalists' battle line".28 Even after the
Constitution was ratified, the Federalists realized that the dangers of dissolu-
tion had not passed. The first Judiciary Act consequently was a compromise
measure so framed as to satisfy those who insisted upon a minimum of
powers and jurisdiction for the federal courts.24 The bill underwent signifi-
cant changes in order to appease the opponents of federal centralization.
17. U. S. CONST. Art. I, § 1o.
I8. Id. at Art. III, § I.
iP. Id. at Art. II, § 2.
20. Id. at Art. VI.
21. Id. at Art. III, § 2.
22. In the Virginia ratifying convention, George Mason launched a bitter and effective
criticism of the diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts. "If I have a controversy with a man
in Maryland-if a man in Maryland has my bond for £ioo, are not the state courts competent
to try it? Is it suspected that they would enforce the payment if unjust, or refuse to enforce it
if just? The very idea is ridiculous. What, carry me a thousand miles from home-from my
family and business, where, perhaps it will be impossible for me to prove that I paid it? Per-
haps I have a respectable witness who saw me pay the money, but I must carry him one thou-
sand miles to prove it, or be compelled to pay it again. Is there any necessity for this power?
It ought to have no unnecessary or dangerous power. Why should the federal courts have this
cognizance? Is it because one lives on one side of the Potomac, and the other on the other?
Suppose I have your bond for kiooo-if I have any wish to harass you, or if I be of a litigious
disposition, I have only to assign it to a gentleman in Maryland. This assignment will involve
you in trouble and expense. . . . Thus, sir, it appears to me that the greater part of these
powers are unnecessary, and dangerous, as tending to impair and ultimately destroy the state
judiciaries, and by the same principle, the legislation of the state government." 3 ELLIOT,
DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADoPTIoNT OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITU-
TION (2d ed. 1836) 526-7. And a prominent Massachusetts opponent of the Constitution,
James Winthrop, warned: "Causes of all kinds between citizens of different States are to be
tried before a Continental Court. The Court is not bound to try it according to the local laws
where the controversies happen; for in that case it may well be tried in the State Court. The
rule which is to govern the new Courts must therefore be made by the Court itself, or by its
employees, the Congress." Warren, supra note I, at 84.
23. I BEVEnmGE, op. ct. supra note 12, at 444.
24. Warren, supra note I, at 54.
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Two changes are of particular importance for the purposes of this article.
In the first place, the original draft contained no requirement of conformity
to state decisions; the much litigated Section 34 of the Act-"the laws of
the several States, except where the Constitution, treaties or statutes of the
United States shall otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules
of decision in trials at common law in the courts of the United States, in
cases where they apply" 25 -was inserted as a Senate amendment. And in
the second place, the interlinear changes in Ellsworth's own draft of this
amendment before its actual introduction indicate that the term "laws" used
in this Section was intended to include the common as well as the statutory
law of a state.
2 6
II.
The judicial history of Section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 is inti-
mately related to the problem of federal interpretation of state law in cases
arising under the diversity clause of the Constitution. In fact, such an
analysis offers an invaluable introduction to the whole study of federal inter-
pretation of state law.
Early in its history the Supreme Court decided that in construing local
statutes and unwritten law respecting real property the federal courts are gov-
erned by the decisions of the state tribunals.2 7  In 1832, in Green v. Neal's
Lessee,28 the Court went so far as to declare that in cases of changing state
decisions the federal courts were bound by the latest pronouncement from
the supreme state tribunal. This case, which stands in sharp contrast to
Swift v. Tyson 29 and Gelpcke v. Dubuque,3" concerned a reversal by the
Tennessee court of its doctrine concerning the relationship of the statute of
limitations and the acquisition of land titles by adverse possession; the
reversal occurred after the Federal Supreme Court had already followed the
earlier interpretation. It was argued by counsel that if a state changes its
rule, it does not comport with the consistency or dignity of the Supreme
Court to adopt the new rule, since such a course would recognize that the
state courts possessed a power to revise the decisions of the Supreme Court
and to fix rules of property differing from the latter's solemn adjudications.
Counsel also argned-and here the argument seems to foreshadow Swift v.
25. I STAT. 92 (789), 28 U. S. C. A. §725 (1928).
26. Warren, supra note i, at 51, 85-88. Warren expressed the opinion that: "It may well
be contended that had the Judges of the Supreme Court been familiar with these changes and
with the history of the progress of the Bill in the Congress, several of the leading cases before
that Court might have been decided differently. . . . Had Judge Story seen this original
draft of the amendment, it is almost certain that his decision [Swift v. Tyson] would have
been the reverse of what it was." Id. at 52.
27. Slipp v. Miller's Heirs, 2 Wheat. 316 (U. S. 1817); Thatcher v. Powell, 6 Wheat.
119 (U. S. 1821) ; Elmendorf v. Taylor, iO Wheat. 152 (U. S. 1825) ; Shelby v. Guy, ii
Wheat. 361 (U. S. 1826) ; Jackson ex dent. St. John v. Chew, 12 Wheat. 153 (U. S. 1827).
28. 6 Pet. 291 (U. S. 1832).
29. 16 Pet. i (U. S. 1842).
30. I Wall. 175 (U. S. 1863).
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Tyson-that a federal court, when sitting within a state, is the court of that
state and, as such, has an equal right with the state courts to fix the construc-
tion of the local law. The Court, through Mr. Justice McLean, rejected this
reasoning and instead announced:
"On all questions arising under the Constitution and laws of the Union,
this court may exercise a revising power; and its decisions are final
and obligatory on all other judicial tribunals, state as well as fed-
eral. . . . But the case is very different where a question arises under a
local law. The decision of this question, by the highest judicial tribunal
of a state, should be considered as final by this court; not because the
state tribunal, in such a case, has any power to bind this court; but be-
cause. . . 'a fixed and received construction by a state in its own courts,
makes a part of the statute law.'
The same reason which influences this court to adopt the construc-
tion given to the local law, in the first instance, is not less strong in
favour of following it in the second, if the state tribunals should change
the construction. . . . Are not the injurious effects on the interests of
the citizens of a state, as great, in refusing to adopt the change of
construction, as in refusing to adopt the first construction. A refusal
in the one case as well as in the other, has the effect to establish, in the
state, two rules of property.
. . .The exposition forms a part of the local law, and is binding
on all the people of the state, and its inferior judicial tribunals. It is
emphatically the.law of the state; which the federal court, while sitting
within the state, and this court, when a case is brought before them,
are called to enforce.
' * * There could be no hesitation in so modifying our decisions
as to conform to any legislative alteration in a statute; and why should
not the same rule apply, where the judicial branch of the state govern-
ment, in the exercise of its acknowledged functions, should, by construc-
tion, give a different effect to a statute, from what had at first been
given to it." 31
In the light of this opinion the decision in Swift v. Tyson, rendered
only ten years later, can be considered not otherwise than as an innovation,
even a revolution, in the judicial aspects of American federalism. That case
was brought in the federal court for New York by an indorsee of a bill of
exchange against the acceptor who had been defrauded by the drawer, and
turned upon the question whether a pre-existing debt constituted a valuable
consideration applicable to negotiable instruments. The New York courts
had held that it did not; but this rule the Supreme Court rejected. The New
York courts, Mr. Justice Story'indicated, did not base their doctrine on any
local statute or fixed local usage, but rather deduced it from the general prin-
ciples of commercial law; and, without examining into the history of Section
34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, he contended that the term "the laws of the
3r. 6 Pet. at 298-299.
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several states" used in that section, meant only the enactments promulgated
by legislative authority or long-established local customs having the force of
laws .s2  To his mind judicial decisions did not constitute laws, but were only
evidence of what the laws were--evidence, moreover, which the courts them-
selves re-examined, reversed, and qualified whenever they found this evidence
to be defective, ill-founded, or otherwise incorrect. And without a single
citation to substantiate him, Story declared that:
"It never has been supposed by us, that the section did apply, or was
designed to apply, to questions of a more general nature, not at all
dependent upon local statutes or local usages of a fixed and permanent
operation, as, for example, to the construction of ordinary contracts or
other written instruments, and especially to questions of general com-
mercial law, where the state tribunals are called upon to perform the
like functions as ourselves, that is, to ascertain upon general reasoning
and legal analogies, what is the true exposition of the contract or instru-
ment, or what is the just rule furnished by the principles of commercial
law to govern the case. And we have not now the slightest difficulty
in holding, that this section, upon its true intendment and construction,
is strictly limited to local statutes and local usages of the character
before stated, and does not extend to contracts and other instruments
of a commercial nature, the true interpretation and effect whereof are
to be sought, not in the decisions of the local tribunals, but in the general
principles and doctrines of commercial jurisprudence." 33
The fundamental postulate of Story's argument-that courts discover
but do not make law-could not and did not long remain the orthodox
doctrine of the Supreme Court. The Court abandoned this unrealistic juris-
prudence in Gelpcke v. Dubuque and Ohio Life Ins. & Trust Co. v. Debolt.3 4
Gray, in his Nature and Sources of the Law,3 5 gives an interesting and plaus-
ible explanation of Swift v. Tyson's emasculation of Section 34. Story,
who in 1842 was the oldest judge on the bench in terms of service and a man
of great learning and of reputation for learning greater even than the
learning itself, was then occupied in writing a book on bills of exchange.
This, Gray believed, would of itself lead him to dogmatize on the subject,
especially so since he was fond of glittering generalities and was possessed
by a restless vanity.
Since Swift v. Tyson the Supreme Court has expanded Story's doctrine
of independent federal judgments on subjects of commercial law and general
jurisprudence until Section 34 has been virtually nullified. Thus, if the state
court vacillates in its interpretations, even of a statute, the federal tribunals
32. 16 Pet. 1, i8 (U. S. I842).
33. Id. at i8-ig.
34. 16 How. 416 (U. S. 1853).
35. (2d ed. 1927) 253.
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are not bound by the latest state decision.3 6 Where contracts have been
entered into and rights have accrued under a particular set of state decisions,
or when there has been no local decision, the federal courts adopt their own
interpretation of the law applicable to the case, although a different interpre-
tation may have been adopted by the state courts after such rights had
accrued.37 The wide scope of independent federal interpretation of state
law is indicated by the following few examples: the federal courts are not
bound by state decisions on the construction of insurance policies, 8 the con-
struction of a will 39 or of a deed,40 the validity of an alleged contract,41
the responsibility of a landowner for a dangerous area abutting on a high-
way,42 contract exemption by a carrier for negligent carriage, 43 construction
of a contract of carriage by a carrier,44 fellow servant rule,45 liability of a
carrier to a passenger for punitive damages,46 the determination of what
constitutes public use of land,47 liability for damages caused by dynamite
explosion,48 and the determination of the questions whether negotiable bond
coupons bear interest after maturity and at what rate. 49  A federal court has
held, contrary to the state decisions in the state of the tribune,50 that the
negligence of an automobile driver cannot be imputed to a passenger in his
car; 51 the court stated that it need not follow the state rule, but merely "the
trend of authority throughout the country".52 This same federal court
decided, contrary to the state court,53 that master-servant relationship did not
exist between an automobile sales company and one of its salesmen working
on a commission basis, with the result that a plaintiff injured by the negli-
36. Gelpcke v. Dubuque, i Wall. 175 (U. S. 1863) ; Douglas v. Pike County, ioi U. S.
677 (1879) ; Burgess v. Seligman, 107 U. S. 20 (1882) ; Bolles v. Brimfield, 12o U. S. 759
(1887); Stutsman County v. Wallace, 142 U. S. 293 (1892); Knox County v. Ninth Nat'l
Bank, 147 U. S. 91 (1893) ; Loeb v. Columbia Twp. Trustees, 179 U. S. 472 (19oo); Julian
v. Central Trust Co., 193 U. S. 93 (1904) ; Gundall v. Manhattan Ry., 2o5 Fed. 410 (S. D.
N. Y. 1913) ; Dernberger v. Baltimore & Ohio Ry., 243 Fed. 21 (C. C. A. 4th, 1917); Ware
County v. National Surety Co., 17 F. (2d) 444 (S. D. Ga. 1927).
37. Burgess v. Seligman, 107 U. S. 20 (1882).
38. Carpenter v. Providence Washington Ins. Co., 16 Pet. 495 (U. S. 1842) ; see Wash-
burn & Moen Mfg. Co. v. Reliance Marine Ins. Co., 179 U. S. I, 14, 15 (igoo). But see
Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 293 U. S. 335, 339 (1934), 83 U. or PA. L. Rav. 523 (1935),
44 YALE L. J. 1113.
39. Lane v. Vick, 3 How. 464 (U. S. 1845).
40. Foxcroft v. Mallett, 4 How. 353 (U. S. 1846).
41. Oates v. National Bank, oo U. S. 239 (1879).
42. Chicago v. Robbins, 2 Black 418 (U. S. 1863).
43. Liverpool & Great Western Steam Co. v. Phenix Ins. Co., 129 U S. 397 (889); see
Railroad Co. v. Lockwood, 17 Wall. 357, 367 (U. S. 1873).
44. Myrick v. Michigan Cent R. R., 107 U. S. 102 (1882).
45. Baltimore & Ohio R. R. v. Baugh, 149 U. S. 368 (1893).
46. Lake Shore & M. S. Ry. v. Prentice, I47 U. S. 101 (1893).
47. Yates v. Milwaukee, io Wall. 497 (U. S. i87o).
48. Exner v. Sherman Power Constr. Co., 54 F. (2d) 51o (C. C. A. 2d, 1931).
49. Sears v. Greater N. Y. Development Co., 5I F. -(2d) 46 (C. C. A. 1st, 1931).
50. Jewell v. Rogers Twp., 208 Mich. 318, 175 N. W. 15I (1919); Lett v. Summerfield
& Hecht, 239 Mich. 699, 214 N. W. 939 (1927).
5I. Commercial Elec. Supply Co. v. Greschner, 59 F. (2d) 512 (C. C. A. 6th, 1932).
52. Id. at 5r4.
53. Standard Motor Sales Co. v. Miller, 30 Ohio App. 7, 164 N. E. 55 (1928).
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gence of the salesman could not collect from the company. 54 In these two
automobile cases the ironical consequence of independent federal judgment
is that, had citizens of the same state also been injured in these accidents,
they could have collected their damages in the state courts. The court has
maintained that, in the absence of local statute or usage, the question whether
prior notice to the debtors of the later of two assignments of an account
receivable subordinates the rights of the earlier to those of the later assignee
is one of general law 5 5-this despite the fact that in Massachusetts, the state
of the tribune, in the absence of estoppel the claim of the first assignee will
prevail against that of a subsequent assignee regardless of notice to the
obligor.56 And in Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal Co.57 the Supreme Court stated
that it need not follow the state rule 58 that there is no implied term in a con-
tract for the sale of substrata coal that the buyer leave enough coal in place
to support the surface of the land.59 In the field of labor law, especially prior
to the enactment of the Norris-LaGuardia and National Labor Relations
Acts, the gap between federal and state interpretations of local law had
widened into such a chasm that the federal courts seldom bothered to examine
the state holdings.60
While state courts differ as to the right of strikers to engage in "peace-
ful picketing", the tendency in the more advanced courts is to permit this
technique of the labor struggle. The Supreme Court, by forming an inde-
pendent judgment, has heretofore too frequently followed a reactionary
trend in labor law. In American Steel Foundries Co. v. Tri-City Trades
Council,61 although apparently the federal court secured jurisdiction through
54. Luff Co. v. Capece, 61 F. (2d) 635 (C. C. A. 6th, 1932).
55. Salem Trust Co. v. Manufacturers' Fin. Co., 264 U. S. 182 (1924).
56. Id. at 191, citing Putnam v. Story, 132 Mass. 205 (1882).
57. 215 U. S. 349 (191o).
58. Griffin v. Fairmont Coal Co., 59 W. Va. 48o, 53 S. E. 24 (1905).
59. Mr. Justice Harlan rationalized this refusal to follow Green v. Neal's Lessee, 6 Pet.
291 (U. S. 1832), and the consequent federal invasion into the field of real property by argu-
ing that, where the state law has not been settled or where contracts are entered into and
rights have accrued under a particular state of the local decisions, or where there have been
no state decisions on the particular question involved, then the federal courts may properly
claim the right to give effect to their own judgment as to the state law applicable to the case,
even though a different view has been expressed by the state court after the rights of the par-
ties have accrued. In substance, he advanced the novel proposition in jurisprudence that state
judicial decisions may not be retrospective. 215 U. S. 349, 357-370 (191o). It is interesting
to note that the circuit court of appeals, upon the return of the case to it, decided to adopt
the West Virginia rule. 179 Fed. 191 (C. C. A. 4th, 191o).
6o. See Consolidated Steel & Wire Co. v. Murray, 8o Fed. 81I (C. C. N. D. Ohio, 1897);
Pope Motor Car Co. v. Keegan, 15o Fed. 148 (C. C. N . D. Ohio, 19o6) ; Goldfield Consol.
Mines Co. v. Goldfield Miners' Union, I59 Fed. 500 (C. C. Nev. 19o8) ; Kolley v. Robinson,
187 Fed. 415 (C. C. A. 8th, 1911); Vonnegut Machinery Co. v. Toledo Machine & Tool Co.,
263 Fed. 192 (N. D. Ohio, 1920) ; Buyer v. Guillan, 271 Fed. 65 (C. C. A. 2d, i921) ; West-
ern Union Telegraph Co. v. International Brotherhood of Elec. Workers, 2 F. (2d) 993 (N.
D. Ill. 1924), af'd, 6 F. (2d) 445 (C. C. A. 7th, 1925).
61. 257 U. S. 184 (1921). The circuit court of appeals had modified the district court's
decree by striking out a restraint against "persuasion" and by inserting after a restraint
against picketing the limitation "in a threatening or intimidating manner." 238 Fed. 728 (C.
C. A. 7th, 1916). The Supreme Court sustained the first modification and reversed the sec-
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diversity of citizenship and although, in legal theory, it was to determine the
Illinois law on picketing, the Supreme Court gave no special attention to
the Illinois decisions; rather it dealt with them along with a large group of
cases from other states and from the federal courts, and it arrived at its
conclusions independently of the Illinois law.
Where the federal courts acquire jurisdiction in a labor case on the basis
of the Sherman or Clayton acts, and where a conspiracy to restrain trade is
proven, an injunction is issued or money damages awarded. The doctrine
of conspiracy, however, is nowhere defined or outlined in Congressional legis-
lation; it is rather a concept derived from the common law. Thus the fed-
eral and state courts within a single commonwealth may differ in their
conclusions as to what constitutes common law conspiracy or unlawful com-
bination in restraint of trade. This situation is well brought out in the case
of Buyer v. Guillan.0 2  Employees of a steamship company, union members,
refused to check, weigh, or load merchandise offered by the complainant for
interstate shipment because the goods were brought to the pier by a transfer
company which employed both union and non-union men. The court held
that an agreement among longshoremen and others concerned with the
handling of merchandise shipped by water at New York not to handle any
merchandise transported or in any way operated on by a company that refused
to recognize unions, constituted an unlawful combination in restraint of
interstate commerce contrary to the Sherman Act. The defendants con-
tended and the district court held that a New York case applied,63 which
declared that a combination whose primary interest was the protection of
their own interests, so as to establish complete unionization of longshore
work not accompanied by violence or intimidation and not aimed at the
gratification of malice, was lawful. But the circuit court, on the basis of the
Duplex Printing case, 64 refused to accept this New York ruling. In an
injunction 65 against picketing in a St. Louis building strike, the federal cir-
ond on the ground that the very term picketing conveyed a "necessary element of intimida-
tion" (257 U. S. at 2o7) ; and by the final decree the strikers were specifically limited to one
representative at each mill gate.
62. 271 Fed. 65 (C. C. A. 2d, 1921) ; cf. Quinlivan v. Dail-Overland Co., 274 Fed. 56
(C. C. A. 6th, 1921).
63. Bossert v. Dhuy, 221 N. Y. 342, 117 N. E. 582 (1917).
64. Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U. S. 443 (1921).
65. Kolley v. Robinson, 187 Fed. 415 (C. C. A. 8th, 1911). A similar disregard of state
law occurred in the case of Consolidated Steel & Wire Co. v. Murray, 8o Fed. 811 (C. C. N.
D. Ohio, 1897), where the court enjoined picketing; the federal judge handed down a lengthy
opinion in which he cited federal, state, and English cases, but not a single Ohio decision.
Western Union Telegraph Co. v. International Brotherhood of Elec. Workers, 2 F. (2d)
993 (N. D. Ill. 1924), af'd, 6 F. (2d) 444 (C. C. A. 7th, 1925), likewise offers an interesting
example of federal misinterpretation of state law. The complainant, basing its petition on
conspiracy to interfere with interstate commerce and on diversity of citizenship, sought to
enjoin the defendants from interfering with its installation of call-boxes in Chicago buildings
on an open-shop basis. The major part of the district court's opinion, granting the injunc-
tion, was based upon interference with interstate commerce; but Judge Wilkerson, apparently
fearful that the circuit court of appeals might not agree that messenger-boy call-boxes were
instruments of interstate commerce, added that: ". . . if it were held that the intent to ob-
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cuit court declared that while the workers have the right to strike and may
use peaceful methods to persuade others to quit, they may not attempt to
induce laborers who have filled the places they vacated to stop work by actual
assaults, threats, abusive language, or other means calculated to intimidate
them. To support this decision the court cited no Missouri cases, but merely
announced that "The authorities are all in harmony .. . ." 66 In its inter-
pretation of industrial negligence law, the Supreme Court has likewise dis-
regarded state holdings. Thus it has been held that a railroad employe
engaged in a repair yard is a fellow servant of a switching engine crew
engaged in running into the yards cars needing repairs.
67
III.
The doctrine, problems, and consequences of independent federal inter-
pretation of state law can be best analyzed through a study of the famous
Railroad Aid Bond cases that crowded the Supreme Court docket during the
third quarter of the last century. Exponents of the Swift v. Tyson rule have
pointed to this set of decisions as indicating its value in the economic develop-
ment of the country. The passage of time and the resulting cooling of the
temper of that litigation enable us to examine more detachedly the interest
in conflict and the judicial attitudes and dogmas that those cases stimulated,
and we can now clearly see through such analysis the legal evils in independ-
ent federal interpretation of state law.
Governmental largess stimulated the early construction of railroad sys-
tems. While engineers might survey mountain passes and mechanical in-
struct interstate commerce is not established, a case for equitable relief against an unlawful
boycott is made out, in my opinion, in view of the diversity of citizenship of the parties." Ibid.
And in support of his conclusion, he cited, but did not discuss, four Illinois cases, not one of
which was to the point. The first, Carlson v. Carpenter Contractors' Ass'n, 305 Ill. 331, 137
N. E. 222 (1922), awarded damages to an employe because contractors and employes
agreed not to furnish material to union men or to those employing union labor; the second,
Wilson v. Hey, 232 Ill. 389, 83 N. E. 928 (i9O8), was an iniunction restraining a teamsters'
union from placing the complainant's name on its "unfair list"; the third, Franklin Union v.
People, 220 Ill. 355, 77 N. E. 176 (i9o6), concerned contempt proceedings where union
officials violated an injunction and the issue at controversy did not involve the right to issue
the injunction; and the fourth case, Chicago, W. & V. Coal Co. v. People, 214 Ill. 421, 73
N. E. 770 (I9o5), was a criminal charge against coal companies for combination to prevent
competition in the sale of coal.
A similar but more far-reaching illustration of federal misinterpretation of state labor
law is the now famous case of Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U. S. 229 (1917).
Although the circuit court of appeals had based its jurisdiction on interference with inter-
state commerce, the Supreme Court grounded it entirely on diversity of citizenship and dealt
with the case as a common law controversy. And to support the injunction against persuad-
ing employes to leave their jobs, the Court cited only one West Virginia precedent,
Thacker Coal Co. v. Burke, 59 W. Va. 253, 53 S. E. 161 (i9o6), which had been decided on
a demurrer and in which, consequently, the element of malice had been supplied by the aver-
ments of the complaint and had been admitted by the demurrer.
66. 187 Fed. at 417.
67. Beutler v. Grand Trunk Ry., 224 U. S. 85 (1912) ; cf. Baltimore & Ohio R. R. v.
Baugh, 149 U. S. 368 (1893). State decisions reaching a contrary result are North Chicago
Rolling Mill Co. v. Johnson, 114 Ill. 57, 29 N. E. 186 (1885) ; Indiana, I. & I. R. R. v. Otstot,
212 IIl. 429, 72 N. E. 387 (19o4).
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ventors solve technical problems, the financiers experienced difficulties in
enlisting the capital essential for surveying and purchasing rights of way,
grading, laying rails, buying equipment, and keeping it rolling. 8 Mean-
while, communities that had envisaged a high plateau of prosperity at the
end of the rails insistently demanded railroad construction. Thus "Public
credit could rush in where private feared to tread". 69 The Federal Govern-
ment donated to the railroads princely portions of the public domain; the
states gave gifts of money as well as of land, or guaranteed the interest on
railroad securities; and local units-cities, counties, towns, and townships-
subscribed to railroad stock and gave, in return, their municipal bonds. The
aggregate amount of such local subsidies has never been accurately deter-
mined, but undoubtedly it ran into millions.70
Various motives prompted these local subsidies. Communities desired
trade expansion and looked upon railroad construction as a device either for
opening new markets for their products or for tapping the resources of the
hinterland. Among the larger cities a desire to secure trade advantages
over competitive communities stimulated governmental subsidies and railroad
construction. In some instances the communities believed that railroad stock
would pay dividends sufficiently high to relieve them from taxation.
71
While there is no way to measure accurately the benefits from local
subsidies, there is, on the other hand, ample evidence to indicate that this
device for financing was of questionable value to the railroads and was pro-
ductive of extravagance and fraud.72 The subsidizing of railroad construc-
tion attracted financial buccaneers who organized companies primarily to
obtain the governmental largess and who hired lawyers to solicit favors from
the state legislatures and municipal councils. Money was obtained from the
public treasury through all sorts of misrepresentations. Thus in some in-
stances the government offered as a subsidy half the amount the company
raised through private stock subscription; and to increase the subsidy the
directors bought rights of way and equipment, frequently from themselves,
and paid for that property by the issuance of stock; and occasionally, after
receiving the governmental donation, the railroad would sell back the land in
return for the stock certificates. Where government subsidies were based
upon railroad mileage, the companies purchased or leased, rather than con-
68. See K= AND, HISTORY OF AmERIcAN EcoNoMIc LnE (1932) 386.
69. Ibid.
70. Ibid. In x871 the local debts of Kentucky incurred in aiding railroad construction
reached almost $r4,oooooo; those of Illinois, in 1873, over $i6,oooooo; Wisconsin, in 1874,
$8,5ooooo; New York, over $3oooo,ooo; Iowa, as early as i856, in excess of $7,ooo,ooo.
CLEVELAND AND POWELL, RAILROAD PROMOTION AND CAPITALIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES
(1909) 204.
71. Id. at 2o6-2o7.
72. "If some lines were built earlier than would have been possible without public aid,
many others were constructed over routes which could not furnish enough traffic to support
them. This not only involved a great loss of public money, but it was in large part re-
sponsible for much of the subsequent controversy over the matter of rates." Id. at 232.
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
structed, the necessary mileage. Where the state legislature authorized the
local governments to subscribe to railroad stock, either with or without a
popular referendum, the railroad promoters employed high pressure sales-
manship, misled the towns as to the exact location of the route, deluded the
farmers by extravagant promises of increased land and market values, and
undoubtedly, in some cases, resorted to bribes. A portion of these subsidies,
ironically enough, went to pay the costs of state and local lobbying for gov-
ernment aid.
73
When a railroad received local boads, it would sell them in New York
or in Europe, or in other available markets, and often at a considerable loss
from discounts and commissions, 74 despite the frequent governmental prohi-
bition against the sale of the bonds below par. In other cases, the railroads
used the bonds to pay the contractors and the manufacturers of equipment;
or the railroad directors would sell the bonds to themselves at a discount.
While the financial history of these bonds unfortunately is incomplete, the
facts given in some of the federal cases indicate that speculators bought up
these securities at low prices 75 and that in some instances the speculators
were railroad directors.76  Having secured governmental funds at little cost
to themselves, the financial adventurers in some cases never built the roads; 
77
or, where the subsidy was conditioned upon the construction of the railroad,
they built and then soon abandoned the road,7 8 permitted its foreclosure,7 9 or
sold it to some other corporation. 0 In any case the local governments' stock
in the railroad company became worthless, although they had to continue the
interest payments on the bonds they issued in exchange for the stock.
73. Id. at 232-6. There were a number of instances in which the local officials violated
the terms of the state statute concerning the procedure for issuing bonds or where they falsi-
fied the recitals on the bonds. See infra notes 95, 96, io6, io9, IIi.
74. Id. at 2o8.
75. See Mercer County v. Hacket, I Wall. 83 (U. S. 1863) ; Anthony v. jasper County,
Ioi U. S. 693 (1879) ; Stewart v. Lansing, 104 U. S. 505 (1881) ; Lewis v. Shreveport, io8
U. S. 282 (1883).
76. See Bissell v. Jeffersonville, 24 How. 287 (U. S. 186o) ; Lexington v. Butler, i4 Wall.
282 (U. S. 1871) ; Greene County v. Daniel, 102 U. S. 187 (188o) ; Norton v. Dyersburg, 127
U. S. i6o (1887) ; Hill v. Memphis, 134 U. S. 198 (1889) ; PooR'S MANUAL (1870-1871) 219,
(1875-1876) 416, 479, 708.
77. See Woods v. Lawrence County, I Black 386 (U. S. 1861) ; East Lincoln v. Daven-
port, 94 U. S. 8oi (1876) ; Harter v. Kernochan, 103 U. S. 562 (1880) ; I SMYTIIr, ORSO-
LATE AMERIcAN SECURITIES AND CORPORATIONS (1904) 358.
78. See Norton v. Dyersburg, 127 U. S. 16o (1887) ; Young v. Clarendon Twp., 132 U.
S. 340 (1889) ; Rich v. Mentz Twp., 134 U. S. 632 (1889) ; I SMYTHE, op. cit. supra note 77,
at 162, 457, 561, 9o7.
79. See St. Joseph Twp. v. Rogers, 16 Wall. 644 (U. S. 1872) ; Commissioners of Doug-
las County v. Bolles, 94 U. S. 104 (1876) ; Scotland County v. Thomas, 94 U. S. 682 (1876) ;
Cass County v. Johnston, 95 U. S. 36o (1877) ; Warren County v. Marcy, 97 U. S. 96 (1877) ;
Schuyler County v. Thomas, 98 U. S. 169 (1878); Empire v. Darlington, 1OI U. S. 87
(879) ; Taylor v. Ypsilanti, 1o5 U. S. 6o (1881) ; Kirkbride v. LaFayette County, io8 U. S.
2o8 (1883) ; Jonesboro v. Cairo & St. Louis R. R., 11o U. S. 192 (1884) ; Enfield v. Jordon,
119 U. S. 68o (1887) ; Hill v. Memphis, 134 U. S. 198 (1890) ; I SMYTE, op. cit. sitpra note
77, at 150, 469, 622, 659.
8o. See Nugent v. Supervisors, i9 Wall. 241 (U. S. z873) ; Scotland County v. Thomas,
94 U. S. 682 (1876); East Lincoln v. Davenport, 94 U. S. 8oi (1876) ; Wilson v. Salamanca,
99 U. S. 499 (1878); Harter v. Kernochan, 103 U. S. 562 (188o).
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These abuses naturally produced a reaction against government subsi-
dies. In the east this reaction began after the panic of 1837, which had
forced many states into financial delinquency;81 and in the west, with its
later railroad development, it came during the Civil War period. State
statutes and constitutions either prohibited entirely or rigidly restricted the
right of local governments to subscribe to any corporation stock; some com-
monwealths and municipalities openly repudiated their debts incurred in aid-
ing railroad construction; and the state judges, being popularly elected,
strictly construed the earlier local subsidies and the statutes permitting them,
so as to reduce municipal liabilities. Faced with the problem of compelling
cities, counties, and townships to continue the interest payments on their
railroad aid bonds, the purchasers of these securities and the speculators sold
or transferred their holdings to citizens of other states, who, on the basis of
diversity of citizenship, flocked to the federal courts to bring suit against
the local authorities. During the course of a quarter century three hundred
cases, arising in almost every state in the Union, were adjudicated by the
federal tribunals.
8 2
The two leading cases in this field of litigation are Gelpcke v. Dubuque 11
and Mercer County v. Hacket, 4 both decided in the same term of the court.
Although the former case is found in casebooks on constitutional law under
the topic of impairment of the obligation of contract, it is important to point
out that the situation therein differs fundamentally from that arising on an
appeal from the state supreme court. In the latter type of case, as we shall
see, there must be a federal question to form the ground for an appeal to the
United States Supreme Court, and that tribunal has reiterated that a change
in state decisions does not constitute a federal question under the impairment
clause. Thus in Railroad Co. v. McClure, 5 where an appeal took place from
the Iowa Supreme Court, which had enjoined the collection of taxes to pay
the bond interest, the case was dismissed for want of jurisdiction. In Gelpcke
v. Dubuque and the cases following it, the federal courts acquired jurisdiction
through diversity of citizenship and, therefore without being compelled to
examine the constitutional doctrine of impairment of contract obligation,
they could safeguard the interests of investors and speculators merely by
refusing to follow the state interpretations of local laws; and, upon appeal
from an inferior federal court, the Supreme Court could exercise unlimited
review of all questions arising in the record. The inevitable consequences
of the differences in these doctrines were that foreign creditors received
more favorable treatment than domestic bondholders, that the latter at-
81. CLEVELAND AND POWELL, op. cit. supra note 70, at 237.
82. 3 WARmE, THE SuPIREmE CoURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY (1922) 254.
83. I Wall. 175 (U. S. 1863).
84. I Wall. 83 (U. S. 1863).
85. io Wall. 511 (U. S. 187o).
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tempted to transfer their holdings to citizens of other states, and that clashes
occurred between state and federal courts.
In Gelpcke v. Dubuque the Iowa legislature in 1851 had authorized the
city council to borrow money for any public purpose upon a two-thirds vote
at a popular referendum, and in 1857 had authorized the city to aid rail-
road construction. After the city issued its bonds in return for stock in the
Dubuque Western Railroad, the Iowa Supreme Court declared the legislation
void and the bonds invalid.86 In a suit by a foreign citizen in the federal
district court and an appeal to the United States Supreme Court, that body
refused to follow the Iowa ruling. Mr. Justice Swayne, writing the majority
opinion, emphasized that the federal courts are called upon to follow only
" 'the latest settled adjudications'. . . . It cannot," he declared, "be expected
that this court will follow every such oscillation, from whatever cause aris-
ing, that may possibly occur." 7 While it is the settled rule to follow the
state decisions, there are exceptional cases and, undoubtedly hitting at the
Iowa court, he concluded: "We shall never immolate truth, justice, and the
law, because a State tribunal has erected an altar and decreed the sacrifice." 88
Against the majority opinion, Mr. Justice Miller wrote a sharp dissent in
which he emphasized the desire for uniformity in interpreting state laws and
warned that the Court's decision would lead to judicial conflicts. It is signifi-
cant to note that the earlier Iowa decisions,89 cited by Mr. Justice Swayne to
demonstrate that the settled Iowa doctrine at the time of the bond issue
favored the validity of railroad aid bonds, related to the authority of coun-
ties, and not of cities, to issue them; and since in the middle of the last cen-
tury standard municipal charters did not exist, city charters were as variant
as the cities themselves and, upon the terms of its peculiar charter, the
authority of each city government rested.
In Mercer County v. Hacket the Pennsylvania legislature in 1852 had
authorized the county commissioners to subscribe to the stock of the Pitts-
burgh & Erie Railroad Company. The act placed restrictions as to the man-
ner of subscription, including a prohibition against the railroad's selling or
assigning the bonds at less than par value. In a suit in the lower federal
court on the interest payment, the county contended that the statutory condi-
tions had not been complied with and that the railroad had given the bonds
to contractors at 66 2/3 cents on the dollar. The Supreme Court refused
to follow a state case dealing with the same problem, 0 and held on behalf of
the bondholder. In an opinion written by Mr. Justice Grier, the Court
declared that, where the bonds on their face import a compliance with the
86. Iowa ex rel. Burlington & M. R. R. R. v. Wapello County, 13 Iowa 388 (1863).
87. I Wall. 175, 205 (U. S. 1863).
88. Id. at 206-207.
89. McMillen v. Boyles, 6 Iowa 304 (1858) ; McMillen v. Lee County, 6 Iowa 39r (1858).
go. Mercer County v. Pittsburgh & E. R. R., 27 Pa. 389 (856).
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law under which they were issued, a bona fide purchaser for value need not
look further than the bond recital. While the decision of the county com-
missioners might not be conclusive in a direct proceeding to inquire into
the facts before the rights and interests of other parties had been attacked,
nevertheless, after the authority had been executed, the stock subscribed,
and the bonds issued and in the hands of innocent holders, it was too late,
even in a direct proceeding, to question the decision of the commissioners.
Evidence that fraud had been practised by the railroad company or that it
had negotiated the bonds at less than par value, the court continued, could
not defeat the rights of bona fide holders.
In the many cases"' involving local railroad aid bonds settled by the
Supreme Court, usually in favor of the bondholder, that tribunal enunciated
a number of doctrines to sustain the validity of the bonds. As the facts
varied from case to case, so naturally the emphasis of the Court changed.
Where the bonds, when issued, were held valid under the state constitution
or statutes, no subsequent legislative or judicial action could impair their
obligation. 2 In some instances the local governments argued that the state
legislature never had authority to pass the act enabling local subsidies; usually
the Court, through its independent examination of state law, would sustain
the legislation.98 Where it was contended that the state decisions declared
such legislation void, the Court curtly announced that it need not follow
state decisions on negotiable instruments, since they came within the purview
of commercial law and general jurisprudence. 94 If the defendant argued that
the local officials had violated the restrictions of the legislation, which aimed
to safeguard the community against collusion between them and the railroad
promoters, the Court replied that, since the bonds on their face imported com-
pliance with the statute, the buyer need not look further to determine their
91. The most interesting of these many cases are: Knox County v. Aspinwall, 21 How.
539 (U. S. 1858) ; Butz v. Muscatine, 8 Wall. 575 (U. S. 1869) ; Lexington v. Butler, 14
Wall. 282 (U. S. 1871) ; Olcott v. Supervisors, 16 Wall. 678 (U. S. 1872) ; Pine Grove v.
Talcott, ig Wall. 666 (U. S. 1873); Venice v. Murdock, 92 U. S. 494 (1875); Callaway
County v. Foster, 93 U. S. 567 (1876) ; Warren County v. Marcy, 97 U. S. 96 (1877) ; Em-
pire v. Darlington, 1ol U. S. 87 (1879) ; Roberts v. Bolles, ioi U. S. 119 (1879) ; Harter v.
Kernochan, 103 U. S. 562 (i88o); Thompson v. Perrine, 1o3 U. S. 8o6 (188o); Moultrie
County v. Fairfield, 105 U. S. 370 (1881) ; Enfield v. Jordon, nIg U. S. 68o (1887) ; Stanley
County v. Coler, 190 U. S. 437 (1903).
92. Gelpcke v. Dubuque, i Wall. 175 (U. S. 1863) ; Meyer v. Muscatine, i Wall. 384 (U.
S. 1863) ; Havemeyer v. Iowa County, 3 Wall. 294 (U. S. 1865) ; Thompson v. Lee County,
3 Wall. 327 (U. S. 1865); Riggs v. Johnson County, 6 Wall. 166 (U. S. 1867); Olcott v.
Supervisors, 16 Wall. 678 (U. S. 1872) ; Douglass v. Pike County, ioi U. S. 677 (1879);
Taylor v. Ypsilanti, 105 U. S. 6o (i88i).
93. Meyer v. Muscatine, i Wall. 384 (U. S. 1863); Sheboygan County v. Parker, 3
Wall. 93 (U. S. 1865) ; Pine Grove v. Talcott, ig Wall. 666 (U. S. 1873) ; Cass County v.
Johnston, 95 U. S. 36o (1877) ; Tipton County v. Locomotive Works, 103 U. S. 523 (88o).
94- Olcott v. Supervisors, 16 Wall. 678 (U. S. 1872) ; Pine Grove v. Talcott, ig Wall.
666 (U. S. 1873) ; Venice v. Murdock, 92 U. S. 494 (1875) ; Roberts v. Bolles, ioi U. S. 119
(1879); Thompson v. Perrine, 1O3 U. S. 8o6 (i88o); Taylor v. Ypsilanti, 1o5 U. S. 6o
(1881) ; New Buffalo v. Iron Co., 1O5 U. S. 73 (1881) ; Enfield v. Jordon, 119 U. S. 68o
(1887) ; Stanly County v. Coler, 190 U. S. 437 (1903).
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validity and the municipality was estopped by the recitals on the bonds.95
If it was argued that the railroad had defrauded the community or had never
been built, the Court emphasized the necessity of protecting innocent pur-
chasers, 96 although in some cases the "innocent purchasers" were undoubt-
edly speculators, the railroad promoters themselves, or their agents.9 Where
it was argued that the legislature had never specifically granted the local
unit authority to issue its bonds to the railroad, the Court replied that this
power could be implied from the power to borrow money.98 In a few in-
stances, taxpayers had brought actions in the state courts to enjoin the
issuance of the bonds, but during the pendency of the suit the local officials
had nevertheless, issued the securities; the Court here held that the doctrine
of lis pendens did not apply to negotiable securities. 99  The consolidation of
the railroad with another between the time of the local stock subscription
and the delivery of the bonds did not constitute a defense against the validity
of the bonds, 00 nor did the contention that the community's taxable prop-
erty was insufficient under state law for a valid bond issue.101 And a judg-
ment in the state court against a bondholder on the validity of the same set
of securities was not res adjudicata against another bondholder suing in the
federal court.
102
95. Knox County v. Aspinwall, 21 How. 539 (U. S. 1858); Moran v. Miami County,
2 Black 722 (U. S. 1862) ; Mercer County v. Hacket, i Wall. 83 (U. S. 1863) ; Rogers v.
Burlington, 3 Wall. 654 (U. S. 1865) ; Pendleton County v. Amy, 13 Wall. 297 (U. S. 1871) ;
Lexington v. Butler, 14 Wall. 282 (U. S. 1871); Grand Chute v. Winegar, 15 Wall. 355 (U.
S. 1872); Lynde v. Winnebago County, 16 Wall. 6 (U. S. 1872); St. Joseph Twp. v.
Rogers, 16 Wall. 644 (U. S. 1872) ; Coloma v. Eaves, 92 U. S. 484 (1875) ; Venice v. Mur-
dock, 92 U. S. 494 (1875) ; Marcy v. Oswego, 92 U. S. 637 (1875) ; Humboldt v. Long, 92
U. S. 642 (1875) ; Douglas County v. Bolles, 94 U. S. 104 (1876) ; Johnson County v. Jan-
uary, 94 U. S. 202 (1876) ; Henry County v. Nicolay, 95 U. S. 619 (1877) ; Weyauwega v.
Alying, 99 U. S. 112 (1878); Roberts v. Bolles, ioi U. S. 119 (1879) ; Harter v. Kernochan,
103 U. S. 562 (i88o).
96. See Mercer County v. Hacket, i Wall. 83 (1863) ; Brooklyn v. Insurance Co., 99
U. S. 362 (1878).
97. See cases cited mepra note 76.
98. Rogers v. Burlington, 3 Wall. 654 (1865).
99. Lee County v. Rogers, 7 Wall. 181 (U. S. 868) ; Lexington v. Butler, 14 Wall. 282
(U. S. 187); Warren County v. Marcy, 97 U. S. 96 (1877); Enfield v. Jordon, I19 U. S.
68o (1887).
0OO. Nugent v. Supervisors, 19 Wall. 241 (U. S. 1873) ; Scotland County v. Thomas, 94
U. S. 682 (1876); East Lincoln v. Davenport, 94 U. S. 8oi (1876) ; Wilson v. Salamanca,
99 U. S. 499 (1878) ; Harter v. Kernochan, 103 U. S. 562 (188o).
ioz. Marcy v. Oswego, 92 U. S. 637 (1875) ; Wilson v. Salamanca, 99 U. S. 499 (1878);
Moultrie County v. Fairfield, 105 U. S. 370 (881).
1O2. Cromwell v. Sac County, 96 U. S. 51 (1877) ; Brooklyn v. Insurance Co., 99 U. S.
362 (1878); Empire v. Darlington, ioi U. S. 87 (1879). Subsequent prohibition against
railroad aid was held not to invalidate bonds contracted for with a railroad before such a pro-
hibition. Moultrie County v. Rockingham Savings Bk., 92 U. S. 631 (1875). The local
officials were held authorized to determine whether the requisite number of voters had ap-
proved a subscription to railroad stock. Bissell v. Jeffersonville, 24 How. 287 (U. S. 186o) ;
Van Hostrup v. Madison, I Wall. 291 (U. S. 1863) ; Venice v. Murdock, 92 U. S. 494 (1875).
Similarly they were authorized to determine whether the conditions precedent had been
satisfied. St. Joseph Twp. v. Rogers, 16 Wall. 644 (U. S. 1872) ; Coloma v. Eaves, 92 U. S.
484 (1875) ; Douglas County v. Bolles, 94 U. S. 104 (1876) ; Warren County v. Marcy, 97
U. S. 96 (1877) ; Menasha v. Hazard, 1O2 U. S. 8I (I88o).
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In a number of cases, most of which were decided about 1870, the
Supreme Court's decisions were favorable to the defaulting local govern-
ments. The legal principles upon which these decisions were based offer an
interesting contrast with the above doctrines and indicate that probably
judicial attitudes as well as legal dogmas played a role in these adjudica-
tions. Thus the Court held that at the time of the railroad stock subscrip-
tion the state constitution forbade subsidies ;103 that the legislature had not
authorized such a subscription;104 that the legislative authorization, which
had forbidden the bond issue until the railroad was built, had been repealed
before the completion of the road ;105 that the bonds were not issued accord-
ing to the statutory requirements ;106 that the authority to subscribe to rail-
road stock did not constitute authority to issue bonds ;107 that where the
.municipal corporation never had any authority to issue bonds an innocent
purchaser had no rights.'08 The Court threw out some cases on the ground
that the holder of a bond which has a fraudulent or illegal inception must
prove that he is a bona fide holder for value.' 0 9 It held that the bondholder
was chargeable with notice of the statutory provisions under which the bonds
were issued ;110 that the bond recitals showed their failure to comply with the
statutory requirements;"' that the estoppel doctrine did not apply where the
municipal corporation was without any authority to issue the bonds.
112
Other bonds were invalidated because they were issued for a greater amount
than authorized 113 or because a railroad consolidation had occurred between
the time of the popular referendum and that of the stock subscription."
In a few instances the Court refused to mandamus the local authorities to
levy a tax in order to pay the bond interest, since the plaintiff had not
reduced his demand to a judgment and then demonstrated that the judg-
ment remained unsatisfied ;115 and in one case, where the municipal officials
1o3. Aspinwall v. Daviess County, 22 How. 364 (U. S. 1859) ; Katzenberger v. Aberdeen,
121 U. S. 172 (1887).
io4. East Oakland v. Skinner, 94 U. S. 255 (1876) ; Lewis v. Shreveport, io8 U. S. 282
(1882).
io5. Concord v. Portsmouth Bk., 92 U. S. 625 (1875).
io6. Anthony v. Jasper, ioi U. S. 693 (1879) ; Young v. Clarendon Twp., 132 U. S. 340
(1889).
1O7. Wells v. Supervisors, io2 U. S. 625 (188o) ; Ogden v. Daviess County, io2 U. S.
634 (i88o) ; Norton v. Dyersburg, 127 U. S. i6o (i888) ; Hill v. Memphis, 134 U. S. 198
(i89o).
io8. Marsh v. Fulton County, io Wall. 676 (U. S. i87o); Kelley v. Milan, 127 U. S.
139 (1888).
iog. Stewart v. Lansing, 104 U. S. 505 (1881) ; Lewis v. Shreveport, io8 U. S. 282
(883).
iio. Ogden v. Daviess County, 1o2 U. S. 634 (188o).
iii. Harshman v. Bates County, 92 U. S. 569 (1875); Lewis v. Shreveport, io8 U. S.
282 (1883) ; Rich v. Mentz Twp., 134 U. S. 632 (1890).
112. Lewis v. Shreveport, 1o8 U. S. 282 (1883) ; Northern Bk. v. Porter Twp., iio U. S.
6o8 (1884).
113. Daviess County v. Dickinson, 117 U. S. 657 (i886).
114. Harshman v. Bates County, 92 U. S. 569 (875).
115. Bath County v. Amy, 13 Wall. 244 (U. S. 187) ; Davenport v. Dodge County, o5
U. S. 237 (188).
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evaded mandamuses through timely resignations, the Court refused to order
the federal marshal to levy the tax necessary to pay the bonds.116 Moreover,
in a number of cases that clearly conflict with Gelpcke v. Dubuque, the Court
merely decided to follow an "unbroken series" of state decisions."
7
The effects of independent federal interpretation of state law in cases
arising under the diversity clause of the Constitution, as indicated by the
above analysis, are serious and deserve more attention than legal scholars
have thus far granted to them. In the first place, the decisions of the Supreme
Court on cases arising through diversity of citizenship have a tendency to
acquire the attributes and rigidity of constitutional declarations. Its refusal
to permit lower federal judges to follow their state brethren and "immolate
truth, justice, and the law"' ' frequently constitutes a subtle warning to local
legislatures that, if they transmute the state judicial doctrines into the more
definitive form of legislative enactments, then the Supreme Court may declare
such statutes unconstitutional under the impairment or due process clauses.
This situation is well illustrated by a comparison of Black and White Taxi
Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxi Co." 9 with Delaware, L. & W. R. R. v. Mor-
ristown.120 Both involved the right of a railroad company to make a
contract with a cab company giving it the exclusive privilege of soliciting
patronage on the railroad station premises. The Kentucky court had held
such contracts invalid as contrary to the common law and public policy;121
nevertheless, in the Black & White Taxi case, arising on diversity of citizen-
ship, the Supreme Court refused to follow the Kentucky precedents and
sustained the contracts. For the discovery of the applicable common law prin-
ciples, Mr. Justice Butler declared, investigation is not limited to the deci-
sions of the courts of the state in which the controversy arises; those prin-
ciples are included in the body of law constituting the general jurisprudence
prevailing wherever the common law is recognized. In the Morristown case
a similar contract existed, but there the town attempted to circumvent it by
enacting an ordinance establishing a public hackstand in the railroad station
driveway. The practical consequences of the Morristown ordinance were
the same as the Kentucky judicial doctrine; but here the Supreme Court per-
mitted an injunction to restrain the enforcement of the ordinance on the
ground that it deprived the railroad company of its property without due
116. Rees v. Watertown, ig Wall. 107 (U. S. 1873).
117. Elmwood Twp. v. Marcy, 92 U. S. 289 (1875) ; South Ottawa v. Perkin, 94U. S.26D
(1876); Scipio v. Wright, ioI U. S. 665 (1879); Northern Bk. v. Porter Twp., 1Io U. S.
6o8 (1884); Katzenberger v. Aberdeen, 121 U. S. 172 (1887); Hill v. Memphis, 134 U. S.
x98 (189o) ; Rich v. Mentz Twp., 134 U. S. 632 (189o).
118. Gelpcke v. Dubuque, i Wall. 175, 206 (U. S. 1863).
119. 276 U. S. 518 (1928).
120. 276 U. S. 182 (1928).
121. McConnell v. Pedigo, 92 Ky. 465, 18 S. W. 15 (1892) ; Palmer Transfer Co. v. An-
derson, 131 Ky. 217, 115 S. W. 182 (1909); Commonwealth v. Louisville Transfer Co., 181
Ky. 305, 204 S. W. 92 (IgI8).
FEDERAL INTERPRETATION OF STATE LAW
process of law. Both of these decisions were handed down in the same ses-
sion of the Court and by the same justice.
The constitutional application of diversity decisions is further illus-
trated by the history of Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell.122 In two
New York labor injunction cases 123 concerning "yellow-dog" contracts the
attorneys for the employers contended that the law as declared by the Su-
preme Court imposed constitutional restraints upon the state courts and
required them to follow the Hitchman decision. While the New York court
refused to accept the Hitchman case as one in constitutional law, the Massa-
chusetts Supreme Court employed it as one of its principal arguments against
the validity of a proposed anti-yellow-dog statute.1
2
J
Independent federal interpretation of state law, coupled with a more con-
servative exposition of labor and business law by the federal courts than that
expounded by the popularly elected state tribunals, has resulted, in the sec-
ond place, in artificial creation of diversity of citizenship in order that liti-
gants may get before the federal courts. This problem has become serious,
since under well-established American law the citizenship of a corporation is
the state of its incorporation, regardless of where it does business. Thus in
the Black & White Taxi case a Kentucky family engaged in the cab business
in Bowling Green incorporated in Tennessee in order to sue a Kentucky
competitor in the federal rather than state court. While the rules as to
diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts require that no two of the adverse
parties be citizens of the same state,' 25 there are various delices through
which a domestic corporation can get into the federal courts. Thus in a labor
controversy a citizen of a foreign state who has a contract with a domestic
company, the performance of which is allegedly being imperilled by a strike,
has been permitted to sue in the federal courts and align the company as a
party defendant along with the union.12  Or foreign bondholders of a cor-
poration may sue on the ground that a strike, or the execution of a particular
contract with another domestic corporation, or the enforcement of a state
statute tends to impair their mortgage security.12 T Occasionally the courts
have held that there must be no collusion between the nominal plaintiffs and
122. 245 U. S. 229 (1917).
123. Interborough Rapid Transit Co. v. Lavin, 247 N. Y. 65, 159 N. E. 863 (1928) ; In-
terborough Rapid Transit Co. v. Green, ii Misc. 682, 227 N. Y. Supp. 258 (Sup. Ct. 1928).
124. Opinion of the Justices, 271 Mass. 598, 171 N. E. 234 (930) ; Opinion of the Jus-
tices, 275 Mass. 58o, 176 N. E. 649 (931).
125. See DOBME, FEDERAL JURISDICTION (1928) 210.
126. Chesapeake & Ohio Coal Co. v. Fire Creek Coal & Coke Co., II9 Fed. 942 (C. C.
S. D. W. Va. I9O2), aff'd, x24 Fed. 305 (C. C. A. 4th, 1903) ; Dail-Overland Co. v. Willys-
Overland Co., 263 Fed. 171 (N. D. Ohio, i919), aff'd sub norn. Quinlivan v. Dail-Overland
Co., 274 Fed. 56 (C. C. A. 6th, I92i).
127. Ex parte Haggerty, 124 Fed. 441 (C. C. N. D. W. Va. 1902) ; United States Trust
Co. v. Amalgamated Ass'n of St. & Elev.R. R. Employees, Unreported (D. C. La. 1929).
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the corporation joined as a party defendant; 12 however, they have not
usually examined carefully into the facts of a created diversity of citizenship.
A third evil lies in the diversity of legal rules within a single geograph-
ical unit. Mr. Justice Story in Swift v. Tyson had argued that an independ-
ent federal interpretation of commercial law and general jurisprudence
would produce a desirable uniformity in those fields of law that concern
problems national in scope. And this contention has been re-echoed ever
since.12 9 However, judicial history indicates that this objective of uniformity
has not been achieved.130 In the railroad bond cases uniformity did not
result from the federal adjudications; rather we discovered instances wherein
the federal courts were granting bond interest and at the same time the state
courts were enjoining the collection of taxes necessary to pay the bond inter-
est or principal.131
The decisiveness with which the federal courts have asserted their rights
of independent judgment and the disparagement of the state decisions that
has openly or impliedly crept into the federal opinions have not only failed
to achieve uniformity but have, rather, created animosity between the federal
and state judges. After Gelpcke v. Dubuque the Iowa Supreme Court, instead
of changing its rulings, resented Mr. Justice Swayne's remarks about immo-
lating justice. In Chamberlain v. Burlington 182 Judge Cole declared that,
even if the case involved the identical questions adjudicated in Gelpcke v.
Dubuque, that decision would have no binding force upon the Iowa court
since it relates to that class of questions upon which the state courts have
paramount authority to adjudicate and whose decisions are binding upon the
federal tribunals. "Any attempt on the part of the Federal Court to invert
this well recognized and settled order of superiority of judicial tribunals
upon such questions, must tend, like any other disregard of law or rightful
precedent, to confusion and anarchy.' 33 In McClure v. Owen ' 3 4 Judge
128. See Niles-Bement-Pond Co. v. Iron Molders' Union, 254 U. S. 77 (192o) ; Davis
v. Henry, 266 Fed. 261 (C. C. A. 6th, 1920) ; Gable v. Vonnegut Mach. Co., 274 Fed. 66 (C.
C. A. 6th, 1921); Washington Cleaning Co. v. Cleaners' Union, 34 F. (2d) 897 (C. C. A.
8th, 1929) ; Detroit Tile & Mosaic Co. v. Mason Contractors' Ass'n, 38 F. (2d) 284 (E. D.
Mich. 1930).
129. See address by Judge Parker, The Federal Jurisdiction and Recent Attacks Upon It
(1932) 18 A. B. A. J. 433, 438.
13o. Professor Frankfurter listed a few cases in which state courts have refused to fol-
low Swift v. Tyson, in Distribution of Judicial Power between United States and State Courts
(1928) 13 CORN. L. Q. 499, 529n. These cases Professors Yntema and Jaffin have criticized
on the ground that their facts are not on all fours with those of Swift v. Tyson, in Prelim-
inary Analysis of Concurrent Jurisdiction (1931) 79 U. OF PA. L. REv. 869, 881, n. 23; how-
ever, what is of greater significance than the distinction of these state and federal cases is the
fact that the state courts believed that the federal rule was applicable and refused to follow it.
131. Chamberlain v. Burlington, I9 Iowa 395 (1866); McClure v. Owen, 26 Iowa 243
(1868).
132. i9 Iowa 395 (I886).
133. Id. at 4oi.
134. 26 Iowa 243 (1868). "In questions of this kind it [the United States Supreme
Court] is, in no sense, the final arbiter, but by a course of adjudications beginning at the
foundation of the government and extending to the present time, it is required to look to the
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Beck launched into an even more bitter attack upon the Supreme Court. And
after the Black & White Taxi case, Judge Dawson, of the Kentucky Supreme
Court, in a speech before a bar association, similarly leveled a severe criti-
cism at the independent federal interpretation of state laws. 3 5
While independent federal interpretation of state laws in diversity of
citizenship cases has produced uniformity of law within the federal judicial
system, it has resulted in duplicity of law within political areas. The uncer-
tainty as to whether a given issue is one of local law or of general juris-
prudence, together with contrary conclusions of federal and state judges in
the latter field, raises complicated problems for business organizations in their
making of contracts, their floating of securities, or their labor relations.
And in tort litigation lack of uniformity produces situations wherein liability
depends, not upon the acts of the defendant, but upon the citizenship of the
parties.
Unfortunately the doctrine of Swift v. Tysons has become too firmly
embedded in the federal judiciary to expect the Supreme Court now on its
own initiative to follow state interpretations of state law. If this phase of the
problem of federal interpretation of state law is to be solved, congressional
legislation is imperative. Several avenues of attack upon this problem are
open. Congress, for example, may require federal courts to follow the deci-
sions of the highest state tribunals in ascertaining the common law or gen-
courts of the States for the rules of construction of their respective laws and Constitutions.
Upon such questions, then, it is, in law and in fact, inferior in authority to the courts of the
States. . . . We cannot, therefore, be expected to conform our rulings to the opinion of
that court upon questions of this character when they are in conflict with the adjudications
of this court." Id. at 249-250. "It will be observed, that, while it is quite true several de-
cisions of this court, which, by no means, as we have seen, settled the questions involved, are
overruled by the series of adjudications declaring the county and city railroad bonds void, the
Supreme Court of the United States in sustaining them have overruled many cases in that
court of well-established authority, and disregarded principles at the very foundation of the
federal judicial power, without the restraining influence of which, the country will be launched
upon the stormy sea of judicial conflict between State and federal courts, or will avoid this
by succumbing to the decrees of one great federal arbiter of judicial questions." Id. at 258.
"Not only is the decision under consideration [Gelpcke v. Dubuque] remarkable for bold dis-
regard of precedent, but it is distinguished from all other decisions of the august tribunal that
rendered it, as well as from those of all other high courts, in the use of language extremely
disrespectful toward the Supreme Court of a State. It is to be hoped that it will not be fol-
lowed as a precedent for like offenses against judicial propriety." Id. at 258-259.
135. "Therefore, while the Federal Courts have always acknowledged the propriety of
giving respectful consideration to the decisions of the highest court of the State on these ques-
tions, the rule announced has inevitably resulted in a constant and unseemly clash between the
decisions of the State Courts and the Federal Courts on questions which so universally affect
the business relations of men as to bring this conflict to the attention of all intelligent laymen.
They have seen the State Courts deciding questions affecting the everyday relations between
men one way, and the Federal Courts deciding exactly the same questions in a radically dif-
ferent way. They are not concerned with the reasons for this conflict. They only know it
e.xists, and they cannot understand, if the law is the perfection of human reason and if the
courts are instrumentalities of administering justice, why it should exist. They cannot under-
stand why the law should be one thing in a State Court and something else in the Federal
Court. In this day and time, when it is the fashion to belittle the law and its administration
in the courts of justice, it should be a matter of vital concern to the members of the profession
that the conflict to which I have referred exists, and it should be their task, as far as they
can, to lessen the number of these conflicts." Dawson, Conflict of Decisions between State
and Federal Courts in Kentucky, and the Remedy (1931) 20 KY. L. J. 3, 4.
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eral jurisprudence of each state. However, the history of Section 34 of the
Judiciary Act of 1789 indicates that in the course of time the judicial inter-
pretation of this proposal might well lead to a recurrence of the situation
now existing. Thus the court may well hold that such a proposal is applicable
only where there is a square holding by the state court on the point at issue;
and through the gentle art of distinguishing cases it might carve out for
itself a large portion of the common law for continued independent federal
interpretation.
A second possible approach to this problem is federal legislation provid-
ing that where a corporation is organized under the laws of one state and
carries on business in a second state, it shall for the purposes of federal
jurisdiction be treated, in all suits brought within that state between itself and
residents thereof and arising out of business carried on therein, as a citizen
of the state in which it carries on business. Since the corporate device affords
the most convenient method of escaping from state jurisdiction into the fed-
eral courts, this proposal would undoubtedly reduce some of the abuse arising
under the diversity of citizenship clause. However, it would not solve the
problem. In fact, difficult questions would arise as to the concrete meaning
of the terms "doing business" within a state and "suits arising out of busi-
ness carried on in such state." Thus, while a New York company selling
insurance in North Dakota through a local agency would very likely be con-
sidered as doing business in the latter state, a second New York company
selling insurance in North Dakota through the mails would not be consid-
ered as doing business in that state; and, consequently, the first insurance
company would be limited in bringing suits on policies to the North Dakota
courts, while the latter would be able to elect either the state or the federal
courts. The present problem of federal interpretation of state law would
thus still remain. It may also be questioned whether the resulting differentia-
tion between corporations and individuals would constitute a valid classifica-
tion under Article III, Section 2, of the Constitution.
A third possible means of solving the problem is by eliminating federal
jurisdiction on the basis of diverse citizenship. While the fear of prejudice
against foreign creditors was a proper motive for federal adjudication of
such cases in 1789, the development of transportation and communications
has broken down sectional barriers. Today an Elmira, New York, jury is
probably no more unfriendly towards a Chicago plaintiff than towards a
New York City plaintiff. Prejudice where it exists today is primarily eco-
nomic in its nature, as agrarian prejudice against urban commercialism and
industrialism, and is aimed primarily against powerful and wealthy corpora-
tions, regardless of the state of their incorporation. State boundaries are no
longer conducive to such hostility. The prejudice argument on behalf of
obtaining federal diversity jurisdiction is, in the last analysis, a demand
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that the federal courts act as a bulwark for big business. Thus, while this
third proposal has considerable merit and would eradicate entirely the prob-
lem arising under the diversity clause of the Constitution, it does not, how-
ever, solve the entire problem of federal interpretation of state law. As we
have already noted and shall examine fully, this problem arises not merely in
diversity cases, but also in cases where there is a mixture of federal and non-
federal issues in the same action and in cases where the interpretation of
state law is interwoven with federal constitutional problems. With the ex-
pansion of national authority, such as has taken place under the present
administration, it is becoming easier to discover federal questions through
which individuals or corporations can acquire federal, rather than state,
jurisdiction over controversies which, in part, involve interpretation of state
laws.
IV.
Although the problem of federal interpretation of state law arises most
frequently in cases getting into the federal courts by virtue of the diverse
citizenship of the parties, it also frequently occurs when a federal court is
called upon to decide in a single suit both federal and non-federal legal issues.
The proposal to eliminate federal jurisdiction based on diversity of citizen-
ship would not at all effect this phase of the broader problem. And the
current expansion of federal authority indicates that, should the diversity
jurisdiction be abolished, skillful lawyers would undoubtedly devise new
techniques for raising and blending federal with non-federal issues so as to
deprive hostile state courts of their jurisdiction.
If the federal question is genuine, and not colorable, and one on which
the decision in the case may reasonably turn, in whole or in part, federal
jurisdiction results. 136 Having once assumed jurisdiction in the case, the
federal court is competent to dispose of it effectively, and this involves the
power to pass on all questions, non-federal as well as federal, upon which
the adjudication of the litigation may depend.' 3 7 -Where a suit is brought
to obtain relief against infringement of trade-mark and unfair competition,
136. See Railroad Co. v. Mississippi, 102 U. S. 135 (i88o); Siler v. Louisville & N. R.
R, 213 U. S. 175 (igog); Ohio R. & W. Ry. v. Dittey, 232 U. S. 576 (1914) ; Louisville &
N. R. R. v. Finn, 235 U. S. 6oi (1915); Greene v. Louisville & I. R. R., 244 U. S. 499
(1917) ; St. Paul & M. Ry. v. St. Paul & N. P. R. R., 68 Fed. 2 (C. C. A. 8th, 1895) ; Mani-
gault v. S. M. Ward & Co., 123 Fed. 707 (C. C. D. S. C. 1903) ; Portland Ry. L. & P. Co.
v. Portland, 21o Fed. 667 (D. Ore. 1914) ; Kasch v. Cliett, 297 Fed. i69 (C. C. A. 5th, 1924).
"The jurisdictional requirement is that a federal question be present, not that the non-federal
questions be absent; so that the jurisdiction conferred by the federal question is not divested
merely because non-federal questions are also present." DoBI, op. cit. supra note 125, at 173.
137. See Siler v. Louisville & N. R. R., 213 U. S. i75 (I9O9); Greene v. Louisville & I.
R. R, 244 U. S. 499 (917) ; Davis v. Wallace, 257 U. S. 478 (I922); Chicago G. W. Ry.
v. Kendall, 266 U. S. 94 (1924) ; Bohler v. Callaway, 267 U. S. 479 (925) ; St. Paul & M.
Ry. v. St. Paul & N. P. R. R., 68 Fed. 2 (C. C. A. 8th, 1895) ; Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. v.
Risty, 282 Fed. 364 (D. S. D. 1922) ; Georgia S. & F. Ry. v. Georgia Pub. Serv. CoMM., 289
Fed. 878 (N. D. Ga. 1923).
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arising from the same acts and framed as one cause of action, the federal
ground carries the non-federal ground along with it and there is jurisdiction
of the entire case. 138  The problem of federal interpretation of state law
arises not only where the federal question is decided in favor of the plaintiff
and then the court continues to examine the non-federal issues in order to
determine whether the latter should defeat recovery, mitigate the damages,
or aggravate them, but also where the federal question, although genuine,
is decided against the plaintiff; here the court continues jurisdiction to decide
the non-federal questions on the ground that, having once acquired jurisdic-
tion, the court is competent to complete the litigation.8 9
This aspect of federal interpretation of state law is especially dangerous
because the Supreme Court has refused to enunciate any definite jurisdic-
tional principles and has sought to side-step the issue. In Hum v. Oursler 140
the plaintiff brought suit against the defendant's pirating of his play. He
charged (i) copyright infringement, (2) unfair competition in an unau-
thorized use of his copyrighted play, and (3) unfair competition as to any
uncopyrighted revision of the play. Only the first of these contentions raised
any federal question. The district court found that the copyright had not
been infringed and dismissed the other two claims for want of jurisdiction.
The circuit court of appeals affirmed this decision, but the Supreme Court
modified the affirmance to a dismissal of the second claim on its merits, mak-
ing no mention of the third. Mr. Justice Sutherland, speaking for the
majority, attempted to clarify the jurisdiction of the federal courts in dealing
with a joinder of federal and local questions. He said:
"The distinction to be observed is between a case where two distinct
grounds in support of a single cause of action are alleged, one only
of which presents a federal question, and a case where two separate
and distinct causes of action are alleged, one only of which is federal
in character. In the former, where the federal question averred is not
plainly wanting in substance, the federal court, even though the federal
ground be not established, may nevertheless retain and dispose of the
case upon the non-federal ground; in the latter it may not do so upon
the non-federal cause of action."141
And in his attempt to differentiate between a cause of action and a
ground for a cause of action, he follows the pragmatic definition of a cause
138. Waterman Co. v. Gordon, 8 F. Supp. 351 (S. D. N. Y. 1934).
139. "A jurisdiction assumed because of a substantial federal question may require the
decision of other questions which control the controversy, regardless of what decision is given
the federal question, or whether it is decided at all." Kasch v. Cliett, 297 Fed. i69, 171 (C.
C. A. 5th, 1924).
140. 289 U. S. 238 (933) ; cf. Warner Publications v. Popular Publications, 87 F. (2d)
913 (C. C. A. 2d, 1937) ; Foster D. Snell, Inc. v. Potters, 88 F. (2d) 611 (C. C. A. 2d, 1937);
Anderson v. Scandrett, ig F. Supp. 681 (D. Minn. 1937).
141. 289 U. S. at 246. The decision of the circuit court of appeals is reported in 6i F.
(2d) o3i (C. C. A. 2d, 1932).
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of action stated in United States v. Memphis Cotton Oil Co. that a "'cause
of action' may mean one thing for one purpose and something different for
another." 14 The Hum case thus left indefinite and undetermined the cir-
cumstances under which a federal district court may continue jurisdiction
on non-federal questions after having decided the federal question against
the plaintiff.
Levering & Garrigues v. Morrin 143involved a labor injunction contro-
versy. Some New York and Pennsylvania corporations in the building
trades secured an injunction in the federal district court against a national
labor union with headquarters in Indiana, several New York local unions,
and their officers. In bringing the case to the federal court the complainants
based their petition on diversity of citizenship and on the federal questions
of interference with interstate commerce and conspiracy under the Sherman
Act. The circuit court of appeals found 1 44 that there was no interference
with interstate commerce and declared that the failure of the federal ques-
tions deprived the court of power to proceed to the merits unless another
ground of federal jurisdiction appeared, and, since the bill did not show
properly the existence of diverse citizenship, it remanded the case to the trial
court for dismissal of the bill as to the domestic citizens or for amendment
of the complaint concerning the citizenship of the defendants. The Supreme
Court considered only the question whether interstate commerce was in-
volved and, agreeing here with the circuit court of appeals, concluded that
"the federal district court was without jurisdiction because the federal
question presented was plainly unsubstantial. . . . The decree must be
affirmed for this reason and it becomes unnecessary to consider the other
ground discussed by the court below and upon which its decision primarily
was predicated."1 45 In the light of Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Journeymen
Stone Cutters Ass'n 140 it is difficult to see wherein the federal question here
raised was so unsubstantial as to be considered a colorable basis for acquiring
federal jurisdiction. And if the federal question was genuine, and merely
decided against the complainant, did not the lower court, under the Hur v.
Oursier doctrine, have the right to continue jurisdiction and to pass upon
the non-federal question of state labor injunction grounds? This significant
problem the Supreme Court deftly avoided.
If or where the federal courts followed the state precedents in adjudicat-
ing the non-federal questions in cases of a joinder of federal and non-federal
issues, expediency, economy, and speed in litigation would demand that fed-
eral courts, having acquired jurisdiction, should proceed to settle the entire
142. 288 U. S. 62, 67 (933).
143. 289 U. S. 103 (1933).
144. 61 F. (2d) 1I5 (C. C. A. 2d, 1932).
145. 289 U. S. at io8.
146. 274 U. S. 37 (1927).
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controversy. Where, however, there is an independent federal judgment on
state law, uniformity of interpretation within the same area may demand that
the federal and non-federal questions constitute two distinct causes of action
which cannot properly be joined; in that case the federal court could settle
the federal cause of action and remand the non-federal one to the state court.
A prompt judicial announcement of such a principle is imperative before this
second aspect of federal interpretation of state law becomes too well em-
bedded in our jurisprudence.
V.
Federal interpretation of state law arises, in the third place, in contro-
versies where the determination of federal constitutional rights involves, in
part, the ascertainment of state law. Although the Supreme Court has fre-
quently said that it will accept that interpretation of a state's constitution or
statute rendered by the highest tribunal of that commonwealth,'4 7 neverthe-
less, when the Court is hearing a review from a state court on the impairment
of contracts or due process clauses, it exercises its own independent judg-
ment as to the meaning and application of the state's constitutional, statutory,
and common law.148 And in respect to constitutional and statutory law, the
Court here carries its independence of judgment far beyond that which it
exercises in cases of original federal jurisdiction.
In the adjudication of controversies under the contract clause the courts
must determine whether or not a contract actually existed, what were the
exact obligations of the agreement, and whether the subsequent state statute
impaired any of those obligations.' 4" The answers to these queries are to be
found generally in the state common law on contracts; and, in the case of
public contracts or agreements made by public utilities franchised by the
state or its political subdivision, the answers are to be discovered in the state
statutes and constitution and in municipal ordinances. If then the Supreme
Court attempts to determine for itself the existence of a contract, the nature
of its obligations, and the fact of its impairment, it must necessarily independ-
ently interpret the state constitutional, statutory, and common law. And al-
147. See Brown v. Van Bramm, 3 Dall. 344 (U. S. 1797) ; Elmendorf v. Taylor, io
Wheat. 152 (U. S. 1825); Michigan Cent. R. R. v. Michigan R. R. Comm., 236 U. S. 615
(1915) ; Palmer v. Ohio, 248 U. S. 32 (918) ; Orr v. Allen, 248 U. S. 35 (1918) ; Hancock
v. Muskogee, 250 U. S. 454 (1919) ; American Mfg. Co. v. St. Louis, 250 U. S. 459 (1919) ;
Green v. Frazier, 253 U. S. 233 (192o) ; Thornton v. Duffy, 254 U. S. 361 (1920) ; Cndahy
Packing Co. v. Parramore, 263 U. S. 418 (1923) ; Stebbins v. Riley, 268 U. S. 137 (1925).
148. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356 (1886); Great Southern Fire Proof Hotel
Co. v. Jones, 193 U. S. 532 (19o4) ; Appleby v. New York, 271 U. S. 364 (1926) ; Larson v.
South Dakota, 278 U. S. 429 (1929).
149. See Houston & Tex. Cent. R. R. v. Texas, 177 U. S. 66 (19oo) ; St. Paul Gas Light
Co. v. St. Paul, iSI U. S. 142 (igoi) ; Terre Haute & I. R. R. v. Indiana ex rel. Ketcham,
194 U. S. 579 (1904); Milwaukee Elec. Ry. & Light Co. v. Railroad Comm., 238 U. S. 174
(1915) ; Detroit United Ry. v. Michigan, 242 U. S. 238 (1916); Milwaukee Elec. Ry. &
Light Co. v. Wisconsin ex rel. Milwaukee, 252 U. S. IOO (1920) ; Appleby v. New York, 271
U. S. 364 (1926).
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though the Supreme Court has declared that it will, so far as possible, lean
towards the state courts' interpretations, nevertheless, clashes can and do
exist. We thus experience the anomalous situation, jurisdictionally speaking,
of a foreign tribunal superimposing upon a state its own conceptions of the
law. Here, as in other phases of federal interpretation of state law, the fed-
eral judiciary dictates on those very legal subjects concerning which the
Constitution forbids the Federal Congress to legislate. And while in diversity
of citizenship cases it follows state decisions on local property law, °50 in
adjudications under the impairment clause the Court employs a definition of
contract sufficiently broad to enable it to encroach upon the property field
especially reserved for local authority.
One of the most interesting and important examples of independent
federal interpretation of state law is the case of Appleby v. New York.' 5 '
Back in 1852 and 1853 the city, with the approval of the state legislature,
had conveyed by deed certain lots below the tidewater line in the Hudson
river; the grantee of these lots, which extended out from the original high
water mark to a line then established as the exterior line and ripa of the city,
was given the right to fill in the lots and all the advantages and emoluments
of wharfage on that line at the end of the lots. Subsequently, the state in
1857 and 1871 established a bulkhead line inshore from the exterior line
bounding the grantee's lots; this legislation forbade solid filling but per-
mitted the construction of piers beyond the new bulkhead line and limited
the water spaces permissible between piers to one hundred feet. The city
built piers out from the new bulkhead line at the end of streets crossing or
adjacent to the granted premises, leased accommodations on the piers, con-
structed a platform or dumping board overhanging one of the grantee's
waterlots, and dredged and appropriated the submerged lots, both inside and
outside the new bulkhead line, with the result that the lots were converted
into slips for the accommodation of the city's tenants and the slips were in
constant use by vessels moored alongside the piers for loading or unloading.
In a suit brought in the state court for an injunction against trespass by
the city, the New York Court of Appeals held that no contract existed by
the deeds of 1852 and 1853 and that the city at that time possessed no au-
thority to alienate the rights to land under a navigable stream. 152 On appeal
to the United States Supreme Court, that tribunal revised the state decision
on the ground that the state acts of 1857 and 1871 impaired the obligation of
i5o. Jackson ex dem. St. John v. Chew, 12 Wheat. 153 (U. S. 1827); Green v. Neal's
Lessee, 6 Pet. 291 (U. S. 1832); Suydam v. Williamson, 24 How. 427 (U. S. 186o);
Walker v. State Harbor Comm'rs, 17 Wall. 648 (U. S. 1873) ; Barret v. Holmes, IO2 U. S.
651 (188o) ; Edward Hines Yellow Pines Trustees v. Martin, 268 U. S. 458 (1925). And
this rule is applied even though the state decision is not approved. Walker v. State Harbor
Comm'rs, supra; Bucher v. Chesire Ry., 125 U. S. 555 (1888) ; Balkham v. Woodstock Iron
Co., 154 U. S. 177 (1894) ; Edward Hines Yellow Pines Trustees v. Martin, supra.
151. 271 U. S. 364 (1926).
152. 235 N. Y. 351, 139 N. E. 474 (1923).
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the contract made by the deeds of 1852 and 1853. On the question of inde-
pendent federal interpretation of state law, Mr. Chief Justice Taft, speaking
for the Court, was most emphatic:
"The questions we have here to determine are, first, was there a con-
tract, second, what was its proper construction and effect, and, third,
was its obligation impaired by subsequent legislation as enforced by the
state court? These questions we must answer independently of the con-
clusion of that court. Of course we should give all proper weight to its
judgment, but we cannot perform our duty to enforce the guaranty of
the Federal Constitution as to the inviolability of contracts by state
legislative action unless we give the questions independent consideration.
It makes no difference what the answer to them involves, whether it
turns on issues of general or purely local law, we cannot surrender the
duty to exercise our own judgment. In the case before us, the construc-
tion and effect of the contract involved in the deeds and covenants de-
pend chiefly upon the extent of the power of the State and city to part
with property under navigable waters to private persons, free from
subsequent regulatory control of the water over the land and the land
itself. That is a state question, and we must determine it from the law
of the State, as it was when the deeds were executed, to be derived from
statutes then in force and from the decisions of the state courts then and
since made; but we must give our own judgment derived from such
sources and not accept the present conclusion of the state court without
inquiry. Ordinarily this Court must receive from the court of last
resort of a State its statement of state law as final and conclusive, but
the rule is different in a case like this.'
1 53
The rights here in dispute were real property rights rather than contract
rights. And the Court here extended the contract clause to cover rights that
properly came under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
which had not been adopted at the time the first state act involved in this con-
troversy had been enacted.
A similar example of independent federal interpretation of local prop-
erty law is to be found in Muhiker v. New York & H. R. R. 154 In the New
York Elevated Railroad cases 15 the state court had held that an abutter
upon a public street, under a municipal grant containing a covenant that the
street should continue as other streets, had an easement of light, air, and
access over the street which could not be impaired by legislation authorizing
the construction of an elevated railroad in the street. In the Muhiker case
the New York court held 156 the doctrine of the former cases inapplicable
where a railroad, already in the occupation of a trench in a street, was com-
153. 271 U. S. at 379.
154. 197 U. S. 544 (19o).
155. Story v. New York Elev. R. R., 9o N. Y. 122 (1882); Lahr v. Metropolitan Elev.
R. P-, 104 N. Y. 268, iO N. E. 528 (1887).
156. 173 N. Y. 549, 66 N. E. 558 (1903).
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pelled by statute to elevate its tracks on a viaduct above the street. The
plaintiff, who owned abutting property granted originally to prior grantees
by the city with a covenant similar to that in the Elevated Railroad cases, ap-
pealed to the Supreme Court, and that tribunal, speaking through Mr. Justice
McKenna, reversed the state decision. He declared that the Court was not
called upon to discuss the power of the New York courts to declare rules of
property or to change or modify their decisions; rather the question before
the Court was whether such power can be exercised to take away rights
which had been acquired by contract and had thus come under the protection
of the Federal Constitution. Having so stated the issue, Mr. Justice Mc-
Kenna naturally answered in the negative. He went on to announce that the
Court must determine for itself the existence and extent of the contract and
that "when there is a diversity of state decisions the first in time may consti-
tute the obligation of the contract and the measure of rights under it." 157 He
emphasized the point that the plaintiff had purchased his property under the
assurance of the Elevated Railroad cases.
In both the Muhlker and Appleby cases the plaintiffs' rights, whether
expressed in terms of contract or of property, arose from grants of property,
the implied terms of which necessarily are subject to judicial construction.
Certainly, in the Muhiker case the dedication of the land for the purpose of a
public street did not explicitly set forth the easements of light, air, and access;
nor is the common law of the several states in agreement as to the existence
of such easements. Prior to these decisions it had not been believed that
property owners have a vested right that no general proposition of law shall
be reversed, changed, or modified by the courts to their detriment; rather
it had been held that there is no constitutional right to have all general
propositions of law remain unchanged once adopted.1, The Muhlker case
seems to go so far as to declare that not only shall the state courts not re-
verse their previous decisions concerning property rights, but also that they
shall not distinguish them in a manner contrary to the Supreme Court's
methods of differentiation. In these cases the rights in dispute arose from
state judicial construction of legislative statutes, municipal ordinances, and
deeds of conveyance; nevertheless, the Supreme Court undertook to explore
for itself the intricacies of local property law, and its conclusions clashed
sharply with those of the state courts.
In significant contrast to the Muhlker case is the doctrine that changes
in state court decisions, though they adversely affect rights acquired in reli-
ance on previous state decisions, do not raise such a federal question as to
,57. 197 U. S. at 570.
z58. Patterson v. Colorado ex tel. Att'y Gen., 205 U. S. 454 (1907); New York Cent.
R. R. v. White, 243 U. S. 188 (1917).
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permit a review of the later state decision. 159 The case of Central Land Co.
v. Laidley 16 0 involved a decision concerning the form of conveyance neces-
sary to convey successfully the interests of a married woman in land. The
Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Gray, said:
"In order to come within the provision of the Constitution of the
United States, which declares that no State shall pass any law impair-
ing the obligation of contracts, not only must the obligation of a con-
tract have been impaired, but it must have been impaired by some act of
the legislative power of the State, and not by a decision of its judicial
department only.
The appellate jurisdiction of this court, upon writ of error to a
state court, on the ground that the obligation of a contract has been
impaired, can be invoked only when an act of the legislature alleged
to be repugnant to the Constitution of the United States has been de-
cided by the state court to be valid, and not when an act admitted to be
valid has been miscontrued by the court."''
By placing emphasis on the phrase "no State shall pass any law," the
Court has narrowed the scope of its appellate jurisdiction in a manner that
has not characterized its interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The literal definition of Article I, Section io, of the Constitution has saved
the Court the numerous and arduous tasks of reviewing and checking the
fluctuations in state judicial and administrative decisions 162 and to the
extent of the doctrine enunciated in the Laidley case, has prevented federal
conflict with state courts in the interpretation of state law.
The doctrine of independent federal determination of state law under
the contract clause is further illustrated in the field of public utility regula-
tion. In the early days of street railways and electric lighting, the units of
operation were local; and the municipal governments granted franchises
which, in some instances, specified the maximum rates. As the utilities ex-
panded into larger units, in many cases state-wide or even regional in their
scope, the state governments began to regulate their rates, services, and
franchises. Where the state public service commissions were more friendly
to the utilities than the city councils, the companies would attempt to break
their local contracts, and if the state commission sanctioned such a move,
the municipal authorities would argue the impairment of the obligation of
159. Central Land Co. v. Laidley, 159 U. S. 103 (1895) ; Tidal Oil Co. v. Flanagan, 263
U. S. 444 (1924) ; Fleming v. Fleming, 264 U. S. 29 (1924). See also Morely v. Lake Shore
& M. S. Ry., 146 U. S. 162, 171 (1892) ; Patterson v. Colorado ex rel. Att'y Gen., 2o5 U. S.
454, 461 (1907) ; Delmar Jockey Club v. Missouri, 21o U. S. 324, 335 (19o8) ; Bonner v.
Gorman, 213 U. S. 86, 91 (19o9); Milwaukee Elec. Ry. & Light Co. v. Wisconsin ex rel.
Milwaukee, 252 U. S. i0o, io6 (192o).
i6o. 159 U. S. 103 (1895).
x6I. Id. at zog.
162. On administrative impairment, see New Orleans Waterworks Co. v. Louisiana Sugar
Refining Co., 125 U. S. I8 (1888).
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their rate contract with the street railway or electric corporation. Where,
on the other hand, the state commission was more rigid in its requirements
than was the local government, the utilities would fight the state control as
an impairment of the obligation of their municipal franchises. And even
where the question of state versus local regulation did not enter into the
problem of control, adverse local ordinances or state statutes were opposed
generally by the utilities on the ground of the impairment clause.
Important instances of this last type of case are Detroit United Ry. v.
Michigan 163 and Georgia Ry. and Power Co. v. Decatur.16 ' In the Detroit
case the railway company had purchased, under the existing state statutes,
certain street railways and suburban lines, and had taken over the franchises
from their owners. The suburban lines connected with the city lines at the
city boundary, but lay wholly within adjacent village and township territory.
The franchises for the city lines had arisen through city ordinances, one of
which, passed in 1889, placed special restrictions on fares. The suburban
line franchises had arisen through village and township ordinances which
fixed the fares upon a basis more favorable to the grantees. In 1905 and
1907 the Michigan legislature extended the limits of the city with the result
that portions of two suburban railways now fell within the city. These acts
contained no reference to existing contracts nor specific mention of street
railway rights; but each provided that the annexed territory should be sub-
ject to all the state laws applicable to the city of Detroit and, with certain
exceptions not material to the case, to all the city ordinances and regulations.
In a series of cases against the railway company the city and state con-
tended and the Michigan court agreed 165 that insofar as they came within
the new city boundaries the outlying lines also came within the fare restric-
tions of the Detroit ordinance of 1889. In the Decatur case the town had
contracted with the railway company permitting it to tear up a portion of its
track in return for a promise to maintain a five cent fare from Decatur to
Atlanta. And here, too, the state legislature extended the limits of the town.
The company proposed to raise the fare, and the town enjoined such ac-
tion.166 In both the Detroit and Decatur cases the Federal Supreme Court
reversed the state decisions on the ground that the legislative changes in the
local boundaries constituted an impairment of the obligation of contracts
of the municipal government with the utilities. The Court expressed its
duty to undertake an independent judgment upon the questions whether a
contract existed, what obligation arose from it, and whether subsequent legis-
lation had impaired that obligation.
163. 242 U. S. 238 (I916).
164. 262 U. S. 432 (1923).
165. Detroit v. Detroit United Ry., 173 Mich. 314, 139 N. W. 56 (1912).
166. I53 Ga. 329, III S. E. g1 (1922).
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While the Court has thus repeatedly enunciated the doctrine of its inde-
pendent determination in impairment cases, it has also declared that it will
lean to an agreement with the state court.167 Frequently, however, the Court
merely gives lip service to this latter principle and employs it as an introduc-
tion to a reversal of the state holding. In some instances, on the other hand,
the Court has arrived, presumably through its independent judgment, at the
same conclusions as did the state court. 168
So long as the scheme of federal supremacy exists, it is inevitable that,
on appeals from state supreme courts involving the interpretation of the
Federal Constitution, the Supreme Court should independently determine
the meaning of the state legislation. Were any other rule adopted, the states,
167. "The general rule of this court is to accept the construction of a state constitution
placed by the state Supreme Court as conclusive. One exception which has been constantly
recognized is when the question of contract is presented. This court has always held that
the competency of a State, through its legislation, to make an alleged contract, and the mean-
ing and validity of such contract, were matters which in discharging its duty under the Fed-
eral Constitution it must determine for itself; and while the leaning is towards the interpreta-
tion placed by the state court, such leaning cannot relieve us from the duty of an independent
judgment upon the question of contract or no contract." Stearns v. Minnesota, 179 U. S. 223,
232-233 (1900). See also Freeport Water Co. v. Freeport, i8o U. S. 587 (1goi) ; Vicksburg
v. Vicksburg Water Co., 206 U. S. 496 (i9o7); Milwaukee Elec. Ry. & Light Co. v. Rail-
road Comm., 238 U. S. 174 (I915); Georgia Ry. & Power Co. v. Decatur, 262 U. S. 432
(1923) ; Fawcus Machine Co. v. United States, 282 U. S. 375 (931) ; Fox v. Standard Oil
Co. of N. J., 294 U. S. 87 (1935); Duke Power Co. v. South Carolina Tax Comm., 8I F.
(2d) 513 (C. C. A. 4th, 1936).
I68. Milwaukee Elec. Ry. & Light Co. v. Railroad Comm., 238 U. S. 174 (915), in-
volved the problem whether a state statute had granted to municipalities the power of rate-
making to such an extent as to deprive the state legislature of future exercise of that function.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court, 153 Wis. 502, 142 N. W. 491 (1913), held on behalf of state
control, and this decision the federal bench sustained. Mr. Justice Day, speaking for the
Court, stated: "It is true that this court has repeatedly held that the discharge of the duty im-
posed upon it by the Constitution to make effectual the provision that no State shall pass any
law impairing the obligation of a contract, requires this court to determine for itself whether
there is a contract, and the extent of its binding obligation, and parties are not concluded in
these respects by the determination and decisions of the courts of the States. While this is
so, it has been frequently held that where a statute of a State is alleged to create or authorize
a contract inviolable by subsequent legislation of the State, in determining its meaning much
consideration is given to the highest court of the State." 238 U. S. at 182. In Milwaukee
Elec. Ry. & Light Co. v. Wisconsin ex tel. Milwaukee, 252 U. S. 100 (1920), the Supreme
Court likewise accepted the Wisconsin court's construction of a contract where the matter
was fairly in doubt. The railway franchise declared it the duty of the company to repair the
roadway between its tracks with the same material as the city "shall have last used to pave
or repave these spaces and the street previous to such repairs"; the city replaced macadam
with asphalt on a concrete foundation, and a dispute arose as to the exact meaning of the
franchise terms concerning the company's conformity with the municipality's paving plans.
In Freeport Water Co. v. Freeport, 18o U. S. 587 (190) (a five to four decision), the Court
agreed with the state tribunal that a statute, which, it was contended, formed the basis of a
local contract with a water company, permitted the city council to regulate rates by ordinance
rather than to make binding contracts. In Wilson v. Standefer, x84 U. S. 399 (1902), the
Supreme Court sustained the Texas court in its decision that the state was not precluded by
contract from changing the mode of procedure in respect to defaulting purchases of land.
Here the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Shiras, held that, while it possesses paramount
authority to determine for itself the existence or non-existence of an alleged contract and
whether its obligation has been impaired by subsequent legislation, nevertheless it is the duty
of the Court to follow the state decision when the question is one of doubt and uncertainty.
Cf. Fawcus Mach. Co. v. United States, 282 U. S. 375 (193i); Fox v. Standard Oil Co.
of N. J., 294 U. S. 87 (1935) ; Duke Power Co. v. South Carolina Tax Comm., 81 F. (2d)
513 (C. C. A. 4th, 1936).
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through judicial misconstruction of their statutes, could violate the rights
guaranteed by the Constitution and nullify the efforts of the Supreme Court
in maintaining the paramountcy of that document. However, this considera-
tion does not demand that in such appeals the Supreme Court ignore all
state law, legislative or judicial, concerning property or contract rights. In
this class of cases it is desirable that the Supreme Court limit its own rule
of independent federal interpretation of state law and attempt to differentiate
between instances where the state courts are honestly attempting to define
property or contract law and cases in which they are obviously endeavoring
to circumvent judicial annulment of local legislation.
A federal system of government with its frequent points of possible
clash of authority demands constant readjustments. It cannot be expected
that the set of arrangements provided in I 789-no matter how far-seeing its
authors may have been-can endure unaltered throughout the rapidly chang-
ing decades. In the judicial aspects of American federalism, the national
interpretation of state laws, as we have seen, has proven a clumsy, frictional,
and confusing legal principle. The solution of this problem of accommoda-
tion offers a real challenge to legislators and to legal scholars.
